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Abstract 
This paper calculates the Harsanyi-Selten solutions for a class of simple signaling 
games. This means that for each generic game belonging to this class one of its 
equilibrium points is selected according to the principles developed by John C. 
Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Harsanyi & Selten, A General Theory of 
Equilibrium Selection in Games, 1988). For almost fifty years signaling games 
have been of great interest for both normative game theorists and scientists in-
terested in the analysis of social, cultural and biological phenomena. The paper 
provides an introduction into the Harsanyi-Selten theory, solves all generic games 
and subsumes the results. Thus comparisons to Nash refinement concepts can 
easily be done and the solution of more complex games is facilitated. 
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1. Introduction 
A signaling game is a game where one of the players (called the “sender”) can be 
of different types. The actual type is chosen by random and is informed about his 
identity. The type can choose some action (called the “signal”) observable for an 
other player (called the “receiver”). The receiver does not know the actual type 
but the probability distribution of the possible types (or, as a Bayesian, he forms 
prior beliefs about the probabilty distribution). The receiver can use the observed 
signal to update his beliefs about the actual type. Hence the actual type can 
choose the signal strategically to influence the receiver’s updated beliefs about 
his identity. It is easy to imagine situations where a type has a strong incentive 
that his true identity becomes public and other situations where the type is 
interested to feign an honourable character. 
Signaling games have been of great attractiveness in the last decades for both 
economists and game theorists, and the interest seems to increase unbrokenly. 
Starting from the pioneering works of Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973, 1974) 
economists have realized that many situations of substantial economic 
significance are characterized by incomplete information where privately 
informed agents can strategically choose actions to affect the beliefs of 
uninformed agents about the true state of the world. A series of papers of 
Harsanyi (1967-1968) provided the framework to analyze situations of 
incomplete information with the appropriate game-theoretical tools. Harsanyi 
demonstrated that a game of incomplete information can be sensibly transformed 
into a game of imperfect information. This was a breakthrough because before no 
satisfying solution concept existed for games of incomplete information. Selten 
(1965, 1975) refined the concept of  Nash equlibrium point (Nash (1950, 1951)) 
by eliminating incredible threats and he proposed the concept of subgame perfect 
equilibrium point and (especially for games of imperfect information) the concept 
of perfect equilibrium point. So almost at the same time the insight into the 
necessity to analyze models of incomplete information and the possibility to do 
this in an appropriate way appeared. 
In the subsequent years a large number of articles and books has been published 
that apply signaling games in different economic arenas. Michael Spence, one of 
the pioneers, dedicated his 2001 Nobel prize lecture to “Signaling in Retrospect 
and the Informational Structure of Markets” (Spence (2002)). From the vast 
literature let me list only a small sample of economic or related fields to which 
signaling games of the described structure or similar structures have been 
applied and some of the corresponding arcticles: 
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 Labor market (Spence (1973, 1974, 1976), Nöldeke & van Damme (1990), 
Austen-Smith & Fryer (2005),  Delfgaauw & Dur (2007)) 
 Market entry (Milgrom & Roberts (1982a, 1982b), De Bijl (1997)) 
 Competition in product quality (Gal-Or (1989), Bagwell & Riordan (1991)) 
 Advertising  (Milgrom & Roberts (1986), Bagwell (2001), Anand & Shachar 
(2009)) 
 Insurances (Wilson (1977), Puelz & Snow (1996), Aarbu (2017)) 
 Finance ( (Ross (1977), Allen & Morris (2001), Levine & Hughes (2005)) 
 Economics of Law (Reinganum & Wilde (1986), Schweizer (1989), Friedman 
& Wittman (2007), Dari-Mattiacci & Saraceno (2017)) 
 Money Laundering (Takáts (2011)) 
 Bargaining (Rubinstein (1985a, 1985b), Admati & Perry (1987), Feinberg & 
Skrzypacz (2005)) 
 Political Science (Banks (1991), Potters, van Winden & Mitzkewitz (1991), 
Prat (2002), Gavious & Mizrahi (2003)). 
Of course the articles mentioned above are usually not solely based on “pure” sig-
naling games as described before but on games with more sophisticated signaling 
structures or on games where simple signaling games are embedded. 
Let me mention that (besides the fact that game theory as a whole has an unex-
pected predictive power in evolutionary biology) signaling games provide also a 
useful framework to study animal behavior. Impressive examples are presented 
e. g. by Grafen (1990), Godfray (1991) and Getty (2006). The philosophical 
theories of the evolution of conventions (Lewis (1969)) and of the emergence of 
language (Zollman (2005), Huttegger (2007), Skyrms (2010)) benefit also from 
the analysis of signaling games. 
Signaling games are, however, also under special observation of pure game 
theorists not mainly driven by interests in economic or whatever applications. 
The point is that simple numerical examples for some signaling games reveal the 
weakness of certain equilibrium concepts, especially of the sequential equilibrium 
(Kreps & Wilson (1982)). This means that a nontrivial signaling game can have 
(or usually has) sequential equilibrium points labelled “unreasonable”, 
“nonsensible” or “counterintuitive” by some straightforward criteria. This gave 
rise to doubts on the claim stated above that the appropriate tool to analyze 
games of imperfect (and, à la Harsanyi, incomplete) information is not really 
given by perfect equilibrium or its non-uniovalur twin sequential equilibrium. 
After realizing this in the 1980ies a series of papers was published which 
demonstrated the weakness of existing equilibrium concepts and tried to 
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overcome this weakness by “refining” these concepts. I will call this the 
“refinement programme”. Refinements are usually made in notions of the 
sequential equilibrium concept and are concerned with restrictions on the beliefs 
a player can sensibly form at information sets off the equilibrium path.  The aim 
of the refinement program is to reduce the multiplicity of sequential equilibria by 
putting more and more  requirements to the players’ “rational” choices.   
Contributions to the refinement program are for example Banks & Sobel (1987), 
Cho (1987), Cho & Kreps (1987), Cho & Sobel (1990) and Okunu-Fujiwara, 
Postlewaite, & Suzumura (1990). The most important contribution to the 
refinement program was the introduction of stable equilibria by Kohlberg & 
Mertens (1986). Stable equilibria are based on forward induction. This means that 
a player’s past behavior indicates his future behavior (which is something different 
from that his past behavior indicates his identity). Many of the papers mentioned 
above are concerned among other things with the question of how the set of 
stable equilibria can be characterized for signaling games. Surveys on the 
different refinement concepts and their implications for signaling games are 
presented by van Damme (1987) and Kreps & Sobel (1994).  
Completely different to the refinement program John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard 
Selten claimed that in any case the rational solution for a game must be a unique 
equilibrium point and that this solution cannot be derived by putting more and 
more restrictions on the equilibrium concept. Instead, given a particuliar 
equilibrium concept,  one and only one equilibrium points out of the set of all 
equilibrium points of this kind. Hence, the problem of normative game theory is 
not to create sophisticated refinement procedures but to develop reasonable 
selection criteria. This should be done from the point of view of an “expert” 
outside the game who is asked by the players (or by some of the players and, 
maybe, independent of each other) for a rational strategic recommendation.  A 
professional game theorist must be an expert for “how to play a game”, and, of 
course, he has to recommend each of his clients an equilibrium strategy and, if he 
tries to live on his new job, he has to recommend strategies belonging to the same 
equilibrium point. Therefore, a game theorist should have a theory which 
equilibrium point is the solution of a given game. Of course, such a theory has to 
reflect carefully all the strategic relationships and opportunities the game 
includes. Harsanyi & Selten (1988) present a theory that selects a unique 
equilibrium point for each finite game as its solution. To quote from Robert J. 
Aumann’s foreword of the Harsanyi-Selten book: “The major implication, like that 
of the first heavier-than-air flying machine, is that it can be done.” 
[6] 
 
In this study we will calculate the Harsanyi-Selten solution for a class of simple 
signaling games. This class is characterized as follows: There are just two types of 
the sender possible, each of these two types has just two different choices, and 
only after one of these two choices, called the “inside” choice, the receiver comes 
into play, not knowing, which type has sent the signal.  After being alarmed the 
receiver has two different responses which both terminate the game.  If the active 
type chooses his “outside” choice the game ends immediately. The game tree for 
this class of signaling games is later shown in section 3. Probably this is the 
simplest class of games which can capture the essence of signaling. 
In the following we calculate the Harsanyi-Selten solution for all generic games of 
the class described above. What “generic” means in our context is explained at the 
end of section 4. The author, however, also find the solution for the nongeneric 
games but to write down all the calculations will exceed the limits  of this study. 
The results are available on request.  
As the reader will see, even for the generic games it takes much effort (not only 
for the author) to go through all the case distinctions which appear to be 
necessary. The reader may ask whether the aim of this study is not too modest to 
justify such a fatiguing exertion. I give four answers to this question. 
 First, despite its frugal game-theoretical structure the class of signaling 
games we will consider can be applied to different elementary situations of 
economic relevance. Having computed the solutions for the whole class,  
the solutions for games of special interest are easily available in our 
overview of results.  
 Secondly, more complex and interesting economic and other models may 
have games belonging to our class as subgames. The Harsanyi-Selten 
theory has the property that the solution of a game prescribes for all agents 
in a subgame the same local strategies as if the subgame is solved as a 
game by itself. This subgame-consistency property makes it valuable to have 
complete overviews of the solutions of simple games in order to facilitate 
to solve more complex games where the simple games arise as subgames. 
 Thirdly, it would be interesting to compare the results of the Harsanyi-
Selten theory with the results of certain refinement concepts in the latters’ 
domain, the signaling games. Unfortunately, an overwiew how the sets of, 
e.g., stable equilibria for the whole class of signaling games considered 
here is not available. It is obvious that for a large part of the parameter 
space the refinement concepts fail to contract successfully the set of 
equilibrium points contrary to the ingenious numerical examples 
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presented in the literature. For a special model such a comparison is made 
in Potters, van Winden & Mitzkewitz (1991). 
 Finally, a lot of the concepts introduced by Harsanyi and Selten are 
involved in solving our class of signaling games. The interested reader can 
observe the concepts “at work”.  So this study can also been taken as a 
learning-by-doing introduction to the Harsanyi-Selten theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. After this introdution section 2 presents a 
brief digest of the Harsanyi-Selten theory. Section 3 defines the class of games we 
will consider and presents the solution for special members of this class, called 
the “decomposable and reducible games”. In section 4 we normalize the 
“indecomposable and irreducible games” and in section 5 we compute for generic 
cases, i. e. “for almost all” games,  their solutions. Section 6 presents an overview 
of the results and section 7 summarizes. 
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2. Relevant Elements of  the General 
Theory of Equilibrium Selection 
The theory of equilibrium selection developed by John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard 
Selten (Harsanyi & Selten (1988)) singles out a unique equilibrium point for each 
finite noncooperative game as its solution. In this section we will sketch the 
Harsanyi-Selten theory only briefly. Some important ingredients of this theory 
which will not be involved in the course of our analysis, like “strategic distance”, 
are not mentioned here. Other components are explained only to such a degree of 
complexity which is sufficient to understand the procedures in the following sec-
tions. We omit detailed discussions and justifications of the concepts and refer 
the interested reader to the book of Harsanyi and Selten. Given these limitations, 
this section could be considered as a small user’s guide for the Harsanyi-Selten 
theory. 
In the class of games we will analyze each player has just one information set, so 
there is no distinction between a player and his single agent. Because of this nor-
mal-form structure we can omit the explanation of the “standard form” of a game 
which distinguishes thoroughly between players and their agents. 
 
2.1. Some Notations and Definitions 
NORMAL FORM. A ݊-player game in normal form ܩ ൌ ሺȰଵǡǥ ǡȰ௡Ǣ ܪሻ consists of 
݊ nonempty finite sets Ȱଵǡǥ ǡȰ௡ and a payoff function ܪ. The set of pure strate-
gies of player ݅ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሻ is represented by Ȱ௜ . A pure strategy combination is 
denoted by ߮: 
࣐ ൌ ሺ࣐૚ǡǥ ǡ ࣐࢔ሻ࢝࢏࢚ࢎ૎࢏ א ઴࢏ (૚) 
  
The payoff function ࡴ assigns a payoff vector ࡴሺ࣐ሻ to each  ࣐: 
 
 
ࡴሺ࣐ሻ ൌ ሺࡴ૚ሺ࣐ሻǡǥ ǡࡴ࢔ሺ࣐ሻሻ (૛) 
 
MIXED STRATEGIES. A mixed strategy of player ݅ is a  probability distribution 
over Ȱ௜ and is denoted by ݍ௜ . The notation ݍ௜ሺ߮௜ሻ represents the probability that 
player ݅ will choose his pure strategy ߮௜ . Given a mixed strategy combination 
ݍ ൌ ሺݍଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݍ௡ሻ, a particular pure strategy combination ߮ ൌ ሺ߮ଵǡǥ ǡ ߮௡ሻ occurs 
with the following probability: 
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ࢗሺ࣐ሻ ൌ ࢗ૚ሺ࣐૚ሻ ή ǥ ή ࢗ࢔ሺ࣐࢔ሻ (૜) 
 
 
Thus the payoff function ܪ can be extended to mixed strategy combinations in the 
following way: 
ࡴሺࢗሻ ൌ ෍ ࢗሺ࣐ሻࡴሺ࣐ሻ
࣐א઴
 (4) 
 
Here Ȱ represents the set of all pure strategy combinations. 
In the class of games we will consider each player has just two pure strategies.  
For this reason we can represent a mixed strategy of player ݅ by a single number 
ݍ௜ , which means the probability to choose the player’s first pure strategy (it will 
always be clear what is meant by “first”). Hence ͳ െ ݍ௖ is the probability to choose 
his second pure strategy. Pure strategy choices can be represented by ݍ௜ ൌ ͳ and 
ݍ௜ ൌ Ͳ. Therefore we can describe any strategy combination (pure or mixed) by a 
݊-tuple of the following kind: 
ࢗ ൌ ሺࢗ૚ǡ ǥ ǡ ࢗ࢔ሻ࢝࢏࢚ࢎ૙ ൑ ࢗ࢏ ൑ ૚ࢌ࢕࢘࢏ ൌ ૚ǡǥ ǡ ࢔ (5) 
 
࢏-INCOMPLETE MIXED STRATEGY COMBINATIONS. An i-incomplete mixed 
strategy combinationݍି௜ is a ሺ݊ െ ͳሻ-tuple of mixed strategies: 
ࢗି࢏ ൌ ሺࢗ૚ǡ ǥ ǡ ࢗ࢏ି૚ǡ ࢗ࢏ା૚ǡǥ ǡ ࢗ࢔ሻ (6) 
  
Using this notation a mixed strategy combination ݍ  can also be written as fol-
lows: 
ࢗ ൌ ሺࢗ࢏ࢗି࢏ሻ (7) 
  
This means that ݍ contains player ݅’s mixed strategy ݍ௜  and the other players’ 
mixed strategies in ݍି௜ as its components. 
BEST REPLIES. A mixed strategy ݎ௜  is called a best reply to the ݅-incomplete strat-
egy combination ݍି௜ if: 
ࡴ࢏ሺ࢘࢏ࢗି࢏ሻ ൌ ܕ܉ܠࢗ࢏
ࡴ࢏ሺࢗ࢏ࢗି࢏ሻ (8) 
  
We say that ݎ௜  is a strong best reply to ݍି௜ if all other strategies yield a lower pay-
off than ݎ௜ . Of course a strong best reply must be a pure strategy. 
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EQUILIBRIUM POINTS. A mixed strategy combination ݍ ൌ ሺݍଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݍ௡ሻ  is called 
an equilibrium point of game ܩ if for each player ݅ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ݊ሻ his mixed strategy 
ݍ௜  is a best reply to ݍି௜ . If all ݍ௜  are strong best replies to ݍି௜, than ݍ is called a 
strong equilibrium point. Notice that we use the term “strong equilibrium point” 
different from Aumann  (1959).  
UNIFORM PERTURBATIONS. The Harsanyi-Selten theory is not applied directly 
to the game ܩ under consideration but to uniform perturbations of this game, de-
noted by ܩఌ . Each pure strategy of a player must be chosen with a minimal proba-
bility ߝ, where ߝ is supposed to be close to zero but positive. ߝ can be interpreted 
as the probabiltity to choose the “wrong” pure strategy by error due to “trembling 
hands”. The term “uniform” refers to the fact that the perturbation parameter ߝ is 
the same for all players and for all pure strategies. This differs from Selten’s gen-
eral definition of perfectness (Selten (1975)). 
In the class of games we will consider each player has just two pure strategies. So 
we can describe each mixed strategy combination which is admissible in the uni-
formly perturbed game as follows: 
ࢗࢿ ൌ ൫ࢗ૚ࢿǡ ǥ ǡ ࢗ࢔ࢿ൯࢝࢏࢚ࢎࢿ ൑ ࢗ࢏ࢿ ൑ ૚ െ ࢿࢌ࢕࢘࢏ ൌ ૚ǡǥ ǡ ࢔ (9) 
  
Of course ߝ ൏ ͲǤͷ is supposed. If player ݅ chooses ݍ௜ഄ ൌ ͳ െ ߝor ݍ௜ഄ ൌ ߝ, we say 
that he plays an ߝ-extreme strategy. He “tries” to play one of his pure strategies 
and the other pure strategy can only appear by mistake. We will indicate by ߮ఌ  
the ߝ-extreme strategy combination which corresponds to the pure strategy com-
bination ߮. 
UNIFORMLY PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM POINTS. The limit equilibrium points of 
the uniformly games ܩఌ  for ߝ ՜ Ͳ are called the uniformly perfect equilibrium 
points of the unperturbed game ܩ. 
The Harsanyi-Selten theory requires that the solution of a game must be one of its 
uniformly perfect equilibrium points. But Harsanyi and Selten do not select di-
rectly among these equilibrium points (if there are more than one).  They first 
solve (i.e., they single out a unique equilibrium of) the perturbations of the game 
and then, by letting ߝ ՜ Ͳ, they obtain the limit solution of the game. 
Hence it must be kept in mind that in the following descriptions of how to solve a 
game we deal with (uniformly) perturbed games. 
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2.2. Decomposition and Reduction 
The first step in solving a game is to check whether this game is decomposable. To 
understand what this means, we need some further definitions. 
CELLS. A proper subset of players forms a cell if for each of these players the stra-
tegic situation only depends on the other members of the cell and is completely 
independent of the strategic choices of the players outside the subset. In other 
words, this subset is closed with respect to the best-reply correspondence. A cell 
is called elementary if it contains no proper subset of players which forms a cell 
by itself. 
DECOMPOSABLE GAMES. A game is called decomposable if it has at least one cell. 
Otherwise it is called indecomposable. Obviously an elementary cell is indecom-
posable. 
FIXING A PLAYER. We say that a player is fixed at a particular strategy if after 
this fixing a game is considered which results from the substitution of this play-
er’s strategy set by this particular strategy and from modification of the payoff 
function in the appropriate way. We emphasize that with such a strategy fixing 
always a new game results from a more complex one. 
INFERIOR CHOICES. A pure strategy ߮௜  of player ݅ is called inferior if he has a 
pure strategy ߰௜  which is always a best reply whenever ߮௜  is a best reply, but also 
in some cases where ߮௜  is not a best reply. Since in our class of games each player 
just has two pure strategies, the term “inferior” is here equivalent to “weakly 
dominated”. This is obviously not true for more than two pure strategies. Notice 
that the original Harsanyi-Selten definition of inferiority is concerned with choic-
es of an agent and not with pure strategies of a player. We do not need such a dis-
tinction here because in our games each player has only one information set (and, 
therefore, no agents). But in order to match Harsanyi’s and Selten’s terminology, 
we will speak of inferior choices instead of “weakly dominated strategies”. 
ELIMINATION OF INFERIOR CHOICES. If a player has an inferior choice, this 
choice is eliminated from his strategy set. But notice that this elimination takes 
place within the perturbed game. In the class of games we will consider the elimi-
nation of an inferior choice means nothing else but fixing the respective player at 
his ߝ-extreme strategy concentrated on his superior pure strategy. The inferior 
choice is still chosen “erroneously” with probability ߝ. 
[12] 
 
SEMIDUPLICATE CLASSES. If some pure strategies of a player yield always the 
same payoff to him independent of the strategies chosen by the other players, we 
say that these pure strategies are semiduplicates or that they form a semiduplicate 
class. 
CENTROID STRATEGY. The mixed strategy of a player which assigns the same 
probability to each of his pure strategies is called his centroid strategy. Hence, 
ݍ௜ ൌ ͳ ʹൗ   is player ݅’s centroid strategy if he has two pure strategies. This is not the 
exact definition proposed by Harsanyi and Selten, but sufficient for our purposes 
and more convenient. 
ELIMINATION OF SEMIDUPLICATE CLASSES. If the pure strategies of a player 
form a semiduplicate class, this class is eliminated by fixing this player at his cen-
troid strategy. 
IRREDUCIBLE GAMES. A game is called irreducible if it is indecomposable and 
has neither inferior choices nor semiduplicate classes. Otherwise the game is 
called reducible. 
DECOMPOSITION AND REDUCTION. The procedure of decomposition and reduc-
tion tries to facilitate the task of solving games to the simpler task of solving irre-
ducible games. How to solve an irreducible game is explained in the following 
subsections. The precise procedure of decomposition and reduction is best ex-
plained by the flowchart on page 127 in Harsanyi & Selten (1988) or by the 
flowchart in Güth & Kalkofen (1989) on page 39. For our purposes a much more 
superficial description is sufficient. It will turn out that games of our class are 
only decomposable if they contain inferior choices and/or semiduplicate classes. 
Within our framework we can describe the procedure of decomposition and 
reduction by the following steps: 
 STEP 1: If the game is irreducible, carry on with STEP 4. Otherwise 
carry on with STEP 2. 
 STEP 2: If the game contains inferior choices, eliminate them and 
carry on with STEP 1. Otherwise carry on with STEP 3. 
 STEP 3: Eliminate the semiduplicate classes and carry on with STEP 
1. 
 STEP 4: Compute the solution of the irreducible game (see the fol-
lowing subsections). 
Here the term “game” always means the original perturbed game after previous 
elimination steps. So each game will be reduced to an irreducible game after fi-
nitely many steps. 
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2.3. The Linear Tracing Procedure 
LINEAR TRACING PROCEDURE. An important component of the Harsanyi-Selten 
theory is the so-called linear tracing procedure, introduced by Harsanyi (1975). 
The linear tracing procedure is an attempt to extend principles of Bayesian 
rationality from one-person decision problems to ݊-person noncooperative 
games. It is assumed that players form prior beliefs about the other players’ 
strategic intentions, maximize their expected payoffs on the base of these beliefs, 
modify continuously the prior beliefs by “observing” more and more of the other 
players’ maximizing behavior, and change in case of need their own actions on 
the base of these modified beliefs. Formally, player ݅’s payoff function ܪ௜ of a 
given game ܩ is transformed to: 
ࡴ࢏࢚ሺࢗ࢏ࢗି࢏ሻ ൌ ࢚ࡴ࢏ሺࢗ࢏ࢗି࢏ሻ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢚ሻࡴ࢏ሺࢗ࢏࢖ି࢏ሻ (10) 
  
Here ݐ is the so-called tracing parameter with Ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ͳ. The tracing parameter 
can be loosely interpreted as “time”, so ݐ ൌ Ͳ marks the beginning and ݐ ൌ ͳ 
marks the end of the process generated by the linear tracing procedure. The prior 
beliefs (or simply the priors) of player ݅ about the other players’ strategic inten-
tions are expressed by the ݅-incomplete mixed strategy combination ݌ି௜ , whereas 
ݍ௜  and ݍି௜  are player ݅’s and the other players’ actual mixed strategies at time t. 
Each player is assumed to  choose ݍ௜  at time ݐ in order to maximize ܪ௜௧ . To put it 
differenty, player ݅ plays at time ݐ a best reply to the following ݅-incomplete 
mixed strategy (see also Harsanyi & Selten (1988), p. 142n): 
࢚ࢗି࢏ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢚ሻ࢖ି࢏ (૚1) 
  
Hence, at time ݐ ൌ Ͳ player ݅ plays a best reply to his priors independent of the 
other players’ actual strategies, which are in fact their best replies to their priors. 
When ݐ increases player ݅ lays less stress on his priors and lays more stress on 
the “observed” actual strategies of the other players. At time ݐ ൌ ͳ the influence 
of the priors completely vanished and, since all players choose best replies to the 
other players’ actual strategies, an equilibrium point of the original game ܩ is 
reached. 
PATH AND RESULT OF THE LINEAR TRACING PROCEDURE. We will say that 
the set of pairs ሺݍǡ ݐሻ for all Ͳ ൑ ݐ ൑ ͳ describes the path of the linear tracing pro-
cedure. In some cases, however, the path of the linear tracing procedure is not 
well-defined. We will discuss this problem at the end of this subsection. For the 
moment let us assume that no difficulties of this kind arise. Then it is clear that 
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the path of the linear tracing procedure ends in an equilibrium point of the con-
sidered game. This equilibrium point is called the result of the linear tracing pro-
cedure. 
If the strategy combination given by the best replies to the priors (i. e. ݍ at ݐ ൌ Ͳ) 
forms an equilibrium point of the considered game, it is obvious that this strategy 
combination will be played along the whole path of the linear tracing procedure 
up to the end (because in this case for each player ݅ his strategy is a best reply to 
both ݍି௜ and ݌ି௜ and, therefore, also a best reply to each convex combination of 
these two ݅-incomplete strategy combinations). 
DESTABILIZATION POINTS. If the vector of best replies to the priors does not 
form an equilibrium point of the considered game, it is clear that at least one 
player must alter his strategy along the path of the linear tracing procedure at 
some time ݐ. This value for ݐ is called this player’s destabilization point. 
STRATEGY SHIFT. At a player’s destabilization point a player shifts his strategy. 
Maybe after the strategy shift an equilibrium point is reached and then this strat-
egy combination is followed in the further path of the linear tracing procedure. 
But it is also possible that a series of strategy shifts is necessary to reach an equi-
librium point at the end. Notice that with each strategy shift of a player ݅ at time t 
payoff shifts for all players are usually connected (ݍି௝ changes in the modified 
payoff functions given by (10) for all players j with ݆ ് ݅). So it is important to 
calculate who is the first player to shift his strategy. It is the player with the small-
est value for t at his destabilization point. After his strategy shift the new destabi-
lization points are calculated (if there are some) and the next player to shift his 
strategy is determined, etc. Let us mention that even if the path of the linear trac-
ing procedure is well defined, it can have so-called backward-moving variable 
segments (see section 4.19 in Harsanyi & Selten (1988)). In our analysis this 
phenomenon will not arise and so we omit any discussion of this issue.  
The tracing procedure is involved in three ways in Harsanyi’s and Selten’s 
solution concept. The three jobs of the linear tracing procedure are: 
 Risk-dominance comparison between two equilibrium points 
 Forming a substitute of a candidate set 
 Computation of the solution of a basic game. 
In the next subsection we will explain at which steps of the solution procedure 
these three jobs come into play. Here we describe the implications for the 
construction of the priors. 
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RISK-DOMINANCE COMPARISON. Consider the situation that all players are 
convinced that the solution of a game is one out of two equilibrium points, say ݍଵ 
and ݍଶ, with the property that ݍ௜ଵ ് ݍ௜ଶ holds for each player i. It will turn out that 
in our analysis only comparisons between strong equilibrium points are 
necessary, so the following explanations are restricted to such a situation. Each 
player i is assumed to be initially doubtful about the “correct” equilibrium point, 
but he believes that all the other players know the correct one and consequently 
they will play jointly either ݍି௜ଵ  or ݍି௜ଶ . According to Bayesian rationality player i 
must form a subjective probability, say ݖ௜ , for the event that the other players 
choose ݍି௜ଵ  and a subjective probability ͳ െ ݖ௜  for the event ݍି௜ଶ . Therefore player i 
is assumed to play initially (ݐ ൌ Ͳ) a best reply to the following i-incomplete joint 
mixture: 
ࢠ࢏ࢗି࢏૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢠ࢏ሻࢗି࢏૛  (૚2) 
  
Since ݍଵ and ݍଶ are strong equilibrium points, there must exist for each player i a 
particular value ݖƸ௜  with Ͳ ൏  ݖƸ௜ ൏ ͳ, such that ݍ௜ଵ is  for all ݖ௜ א ሺݖƸ௜ ǡ ͳሿ a strong 
best reply to the joint mixture given in (12), but for all ݖ௜ א ሾͲǡݖƸ௜ ሻ ݍ௜ଶ is a strong 
best reply. 
But how does player i form his subjective probability ݖ௜  about the “correct” equi-
librium point? Or, to put it more precisely, what should the other players think 
about the way player i forms ݖ௜? As Bayesians the other players have to construct 
a distribution function of ݖ௜  over the interval ሾͲǡͳሿ. Because the initial state must 
be considered as a situation of complete naivety, there is no reason whatsoever to 
put more weight on a specific value of ݖ௜  than on another one.  Hence, Harsanyi 
and Selten assume that ݖ௜  is uniformly distributed over the interval ሾͲǡͳሿ. 
 This has the consequence that player i is assumed to choose initially (at ݐ ൌ Ͳ) ݍ௜ଵ 
with probability ͳ െ ݖƸ௜  and ݍ௜ଶ with probability ݖƸ௜ , where as explained above ݖƸ௜ is 
that particular value of ݖ௜  of player i that makes him indifferent between ݍ௜ଵ and 
ݍ௜ଶ. So the prior beliefs about player i are that he plays the following mixed strate-
gy: 
࢖࢏ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢠො࢏ሻࢗ࢏૚ ൅ ࢠො࢏ࢗ࢏૛ (૚3) 
  
These priors are also called the bicentric priors because just two equilibrium 
points are compared. 
Given these priors for all players, the path of the linear tracing procedure can be 
computed. If the result of the linear tracing procedure is ݍଵ, than we will say that  
ݍଵ risk-dominates ݍଶ. If ݍଶ is the result, ݍଶ risk-dominates ݍଵ. 
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SUBSTITUTION OF A CANDIDATE SET. Sometimes in the calculation of the 
Harsanyi-Selten solution for a given game the linear tracing procedure is used to 
substitute a set of equilibrium points by a single equilibrium point. In such a case 
the priors about player i are formed by the equally weighted average of his mixed 
strategies used in the equilibrium points of the set that should be substituted. In 
our case it will turn out that only sets of two pure equilibrium points must be 
substituted, so the priors are simply given by the players’ centroid strategies (see 
subsection 2.2). With the term “substitution of a candidate set” used in the next 
subsection we mean the following: If we replace a set of equilibrium points (the 
candidate set) by that equilibrium point which is the result of the linear tracing 
procedure using the players’ centroid strategies as their priors, then we say that 
this set of equilibrium points is substituted.  
SOLUTION OF A BASIC GAME. In the next subsection we introduce the concept 
of a basic game. Here we want to state that the solution of a basic game is the re-
sult of the linear tracing procedure using the players’ centroid strategies in that 
basic game as their priors.  
EXISTENCE OF A WELL-DEFINED PATH OF THE LINEAR TRACING PROCE-
DURE. Hitherto, we have excluded any discussion about the uniqueness of the 
path (and, therefore, the result) of the linear tracing procedure. Unfortunately, 
such a well-defined path exists only for “almost all” games. For example, in a game 
of complete symmetry (or complete asymmetry) between two players, they will 
have the same destabilization points and the path of the linear tracing procedure 
does not have a unique continuation after this point (think of a symmetric “battle 
of sexes” game). 
Harsanyi and Selten attempted to single out a unique equilibrium point for all fi-
nite games and not only for the generic subset. So they could not be satisfied that 
the linear tracing procedure as one of their most important tools in solving games 
lead to dubious results in nongeneric cases. Therefore they introduced the loga-
rithmic tracing procedure. The logarithmic tracing procedure generates a well-
defined path for all finite games and the result of the logarithmic tracing proce-
dure is the same as the result of the linear tracing procedure if the latter’s path is 
well-defined. Hence the logarithmic tracing procedure can be considered as a 
generalization of the linear tracing procedure. 
The payoff function along the logarithmic tracing procedure differs from that of 
the linear tracing procedure (see (10)) by an additional logarithmic term which 
“punishes” to some extent each deviation from the player’s centroid strategy. This 
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term ensures that for each ݐ ൏ ͳ each player has a unique best reply in complete-
ly mixed strategies to any strategy combination of the other players. 
The logarithmic tracing procedure only comes into play in nongeneric games. In 
this work we will only determine the solution of the generic elements in our class 
of signaling games, therefore the linear tracing procedure is sufficient. Since 
1988, when Harsanyi’s and Selten’s book was published, some properties of the 
tracing procedure and its computability are investigated in more detail (Schanuel, 
Simon & Zame (1991),  van den Elzen & Talman (1995), van den Elzen (1996), 
Herings & van den Elzen  (2002)).  However, for our purposes these advances are 
of no relevance. 
 
2.4. Solution of Irreducible Games 
After the preparations given in subsection 2.2 (the process of decomposition and 
reduction) and in subsection 2.3 (the linear tracing procedure), we want to ex-
plain in this subsection how Harsanyi and Selten solve an irreducible game (for 
the definition see subsection 2.2). However, we need some further definitions. 
FORMATIONS. Consider a game ܨ which results from a game G by eliminating 
some pure strategies (and changing the payoff functions in the appropriate way). 
If for each i-incomplete mixed strategy combination permissible in F player i’s 
best replies in G are all contained in F, and if this holds for each player, we call F a 
formation.  
PRIMITIVE FORMATIONS.  A formation is called primitive if it contains no prop-
er subformations. For example, a strong equilibrium point generates a primitive 
formation. However, strong equilibrium points do not always exist. Harsanyi and 
Selten introduced the concept of a primitive formation to have a concept with 
similar stability properties as a strong equilibrium point. 
BASIC GAMES. A game is called basic if it is irreducible and if it contains no for-
mations. Hence, each irreducible game must be basic or it must contain some 
primitive formations. 
INITIAL CANDIDATES. The initial candidates for the solution of an irreducible 
game are defined as follows: If the game is basic, then the solution of this basic 
game is the only initial candidate. If the game is not basic, then the solutions of 
the primitive formations of this game are the initial candidates. The set of initial 
candidates is also called the first candidate set. 
[18] 
 
It will turn out that in the class of games we consider a game can have two primi-
tive formations at most, and that in this case these two primitive formations must 
be generated each by a strong pure equilibrium point. So the first candidate set 
contains either one (pure or mixed) or two (pure) equilibrium points.  
If there is only one candidate, this equilibrium point is the solution of the game. If 
we have two initial candidates, we first look whether one of them strictly payoff-
dominates the other one. If this is not the case, a risk-dominance comparison via 
the linear tracing procedure between these two equilibrium points is necessary 
(see subsection 2.3). The solution of the game is then the equilibrium point that 
dominates (strictly payoff-dominates or risk-dominates) the other one, where 
priority is given to payoff-dominance. However, it is possible that neither (strict) 
payoff-dominance nor risk-dominance exist between two equilibrium points. No 
risk-dominance relationship between two equilibrium points is given if the path 
of the (logarithmic) tracing procedure with the bicentric priors does not end in 
one of these equilibrium points. This can only happen in degenerate cases. Then a 
substitution step becomes necessary. 
SUBSTITUTION OF A CANDIDATE SET (see also subsection 2.3).  If the first can-
didate set consists of two equilibrium points without dominance relationship, we 
substitute this set by the equilibrium point which is the result of the tracing pro-
cedure using the players’ centroid strategies as their priors. This equilibrium 
point is the solution of the game. Notice that this resulting equilibrium is general-
ly not among the two initial candidates. For example, in a symmetric battle-of-
sexes game the first candidate set consists of the two pure equilibrium points, but 
its substitute (and, therefore, the solution of the game) is the mixed equilibrium 
point. 
SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES. In subsection 2.2 we explained how games are 
transformed to become irreducible games. In the present subsection we defined 
how an irreducible game is solved. First, we check whether the game is basic. If 
the game is basic we compute its solution, which is the result of the linear tracing 
procedure using the players’ centroid strategies as their priors. If the game is not 
basic, we compute the solutions of its primitive formations. If the game has two 
primitive formations (generated by two pure equilibrium points), we make a 
payoff-dominance comparison and, if necessary, a risk-dominance comparison be-
tween the two generating pure equilibrium points. If no dominance relationship 
exists we compute the result of the linear tracing procedure using the players’ cen-
troid strategies as their priors.  In any case we come out with a unique equilibrium 
point which is called the solution of the game. 
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Pay special attention to the fact that all procedures mentioned above are done 
within the perturbed game. The solution of the unperturbed game is obtained as 
the limit of the solutions of its perturbations letting ߝ go to zero. 
 
2.5. Solution of 2x2 Games with Two Strong     
Equilibrium Points 
In many game-theoretical models 2x2-games arise as subgames or cells (see sub-
section 2.2). Therefore their solutions are of special interest. Here we are con-
cerned only with the equilibrium selection problem resulting of a 2x2-game with 
two strong equilibrium points. Let such a game be given as follows (figure 1): 
 
 Player 2 
ܷଶ ଶܸ 
Player 1 
ଵܷ 
ܽଵଵ 
 
 
 
ܾଵଵ 
ܽଵଶ 
 
 
 
ܾଵଶ 
ଵܸ 
ܽଶଵ 
 
 
 
ܾଶଵ 
ܽଶଶ 
 
 
 
ܾଶଶ 
 
Figure 1: A 2x2-game with the two strong equilibrium points 
ሺࢁ૚ǡ ࢁ૛ሻ and ሺࢂ૚ǡ ࢂ૛ሻ because we assume that ࢇ૚૚ ൐ ࢇ૛૚, 
ࢇ૛૛ ൐ ࢇ૚૛, ࢈૚૚ ൐ ࢈૚૛ and ࢈૛૛ ൐ ࢈૛૚ hold. For each strate-
gy combination, player 1’s payoff is shown in the upper left 
corner and player 2’s payoff is shown in the lower right cor-
ner of the respective square. 
 
 
The game described in figure 1 can be transformed in a best-reply structure pre-
serving game, as shown in figure 2: 
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 Player 2 
ܷଶ ଶܸ 
Player 1 
ଵܷ 
ݑଵ 
 
 
 
ݑଶ 
Ͳ 
 
 
 
Ͳ 
ଵܸ 
Ͳ 
 
 
 
Ͳ 
ݒଵ 
 
 
 
ݒଶ 
 
Figure 2: A 2x2-game with the two strong equilibrium points 
ሺࢁ૚ǡ ࢁ૛ሻ and ሺࢂ૚ǡ ࢂ૛ሻ which results from the following best-
reply structure preserving transformations: ࢛૚ ൌ ࢇ૚૚ െ
ࢇ૛૚ ൐ Ͳ, ࢜૚ ൌ ࢇ૛૛ െ ࢇ૚૛ ൐ Ͳ, ࢛૛ ൌ ࢈૚૚ െ ࢈૚૛ ൐ Ͳ and 
࢜૛ ൌ ࢈૛૛ െ ࢈૛૚ ൐ Ͳ. 
 
The term “best-reply preserving transformations” simply means that after some 
payoff manipulations of a game G a game G’ is received with the property that for 
each player his best replies against all opponents’ strategy combinations are the 
same in both games. 
Harsanyi and Selten provide an axiomatic foundation for the risk-dominance 
comparison between two pure equilibrium points of a 2x2-game like in figure 2. 
In their book they proof that three plausible requirements on the solution of the 
selection problem between the two equilibrium points ሺ ଵܷǡ ଶܷሻ and ሺ ଵܸǡ ଶܸሻ are 
only fulfilled by the following criterion: 
 ሺ ଵܷǡ ଶܷሻ is the solution if ݑଵݑଶ ൐ ݒଵݒଶ holds. 
 ሺ ଵܸǡ ଶܸሻ is the solution if ݑଵݑଶ ൏ ݒଵݒଶ holds. 
The mixed equilibrium of the game is its solution if  ݑଵݑଶ ൌ ݒଵݒଶ holds. 
Furthermore, Harsanyi and Selten show that these results are equivalent to those 
obtained by making a risk-dominance comparison between the two equilibrium 
points via the linear tracing procedure (see subsection 2.3). This means that the 
axiomatically founded solution concept for 2x2 games with two strong equilibri-
um points is embedded into the general solution theory for all games roughly de-
scribed in this section. The comparison of the payoff products ݑଵݑଶ and ݒଵݒଶ is 
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similar to the analysis of the Nash product (Nash (1953)). In consequence, this 
embedding is called the Nash property of the Harsanyi-Selten theory. 
The solution of a 2x2-game can therefore be obtained without explicitly making 
use of the tracing procedure. If the game is given as in figure 1, then you have to 
check whether one of the two equilibrium points strictly payoff-dominates the 
other one. In this case, the payoff-dominating equilibrium point is the solution of 
the game. Otherwise, you have to transform the game into a game as in figure 2 
preserving the best-reply structure. Then you have to compute which of the equi-
librium points yields the higher “Nash product”. This one is the solution of the 
game. If both equilibrium points yield the same Nash product, the mixed equilib-
rium of the game is its solution. 
In the following lemma we show that there exists a simple measure equivalent to 
the Nash product criterion in 2x2-games, which is in some applications easier to 
compute (see Potters, van Winden & Mitzkewitz (1991)). 
LEMMA. Given a 2x2-game as in figure 2. Then the two pure strategies (one for 
each player) chosen in the pure equilibrium with the higher product of payoffs 
(Nash product) are chosen in the mixed equilibrium point of the game with 
probabilities adding up to less than 1. 
PROOF. In the mixed equilibrium ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶሻ of the game in figure 2 the strategies ଵܷ 
and ଶܷ are chosen with the following probabilities: 
ࢗ૚ ൌ
࢜૛
࢛૛ ൅ ࢜૛
 (૚4) 
 
 
 
ࢗ૛ ൌ
࢜૚
࢛૚ ൅ ࢜૚
 (૚5) 
 
 
It follows: 
 
  
ࢗ૚ ൅ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૚ ൅
࢜૚࢜૛ െ ࢛૚࢛૛
ሺ࢛૚ ൅ ࢜૚ሻሺ࢛૛ ൅ ࢜૛ሻ
 (૚6) 
  
  
Since all ݑ௜  and ݒ௜ are greater than zero, it follows that ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ ൐ ͳ if ݒଵݒଶ ൐ ݑଵݑଶ 
and that ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶ ൏ ͳ if ݒଵݒଶ ൏ ݑଵݑଶ. ז 
We  make use of this result in our analysis. 
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3. The Class of Games Considered and 
the Solution of Its Decomposable and 
Reducible Members 
Consider the following class of signaling games. The sender is one of two types 
which occur with known positive probabilities ߙ and ͳ െ ߙ. Each type has to 
choose between two alternatives: the move “inside” and the move “outside”. If the 
activated type chooses “outside” the game is finished, but if he chooses “inside” a 
receiver observes this message without being informed about the sender’s type. 
Afterwards, the receiver has to choose between two responses, called “left” and 
“right” to terminate the game. At each of the six possible endpoints of the game 
the players receive their respective payoffs. Following Harsanyi (1967-1968) we 
consider the two types as different players, hence the payoff vectors have three 
components. Figure 3 shows the extensive form of the game without specifying 
the payoff vectors. The two types of the sender are called player 1 and player 2, 
and the receiver is called player 3. Nature choosing sender’s type by chance is 
called player 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The extensive form of the considered class of 
games. Information sets are indicated by the dotted lines. 
Payoff vectors are unspecified. 
 
0 
3 
2 1 
ሺߙሻ ሺͳȄߙሻ 
left left right right 
inside inside outside outside 
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NORMALIZATION. In this section, we make some steps to normalize this class of 
signaling games as follows: A type always receives nothing if he is not active. Fur-
thermore, we subtract the payoff vector after an “outside” choice of a type from all 
three payoff vectors which can be achieved if this type has become active. This 
transformation preserves the best-reply structure for all players. By this proce-
dure the new payoff vectors of the normalized game are obtained. The payoffs are 
named as in figure 4. We will call this steps semi-normalization. In section 4, deal-
ing with the indecomposable and irreducible games, we will proceed with the 
normalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The extensive form of the semi-normalized games.  
 
DECOMPOSITION AND REDUCTION. Now we explain the meaning of “decom-
posable” and “reducible” (see subsection 2.2) in the normalized signaling games. 
Fortunately, for the simple game structure considered here the two concepts are 
closely connected. 
ELEMENTARY CELLS. First we look on possible kinds of elementary cells (see 
subsection 2.2). Obviously, the two types together cannot form an elementary cell 
because their best replies are always independent from each other. Furthermore, 
the receiver together with one type cannot form an elementary cell by the follow-
ing reason. If they form a cell, the receiver must be independent from the strategy 
0 
3 
2 1 
ሺߙሻ ሺͳȄߙሻ 
left left right right 
inside inside outside outside 
ܽଶ 
Ͳ 
ܿଶ 
ܽଵ 
Ͳ 
ܿଵ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
ܾଵ 
ܿଷ 
Ͳ 
ܾଶ 
ܿସ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
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of the other type and, therefore, the receiver should calculate only for the situa-
tion after an “inside” choice of the cell type. But this means that the receiver’s best 
reply is independent of the probability of this move. Consequently, in this case the 
receiver forms an elementary cell by himself. It follows, that,if signaling games of 
our class are decomposable, an elementary cell is formed by a single player. 
CONDITIONS THAT A TYPE FORMS A CELL. By definition, the best-reply struc-
ture of a type forming a cell must be independent of the receiver’s strategy. This 
situation can occur in three ways: 
1. The cell type receives in one case more than null and in the other case at 
least null after an “inside” choice in dependence on the receiver’s response. 
This means that the cell type’s “outside” choice is inferior. 
2. The cell type receives in one case less than null and in the other case he re-
ceives null at most after an “inside” choice in dependence on the receiver’s 
response. This means that the cell type’s “inside” choice is inferior. 
3. The cell type receives always null. This means that his two pure strategies 
are semiduplicates (see subsection 2.2). 
CONDITIONS THAT THE RECEIVER FORMS A CELL. This  situation is given in 
two cases : 
1. One of the receiver’s choices is (weakly) dominated. Then this pure strate-
gy is, of course, inferior. 
2. The payoffs of the receiver only depend on the active type but not on his 
own choice. Then his two pure strategies are semiduplicate classes. 
REDUCTION. In our simple games, the process of solving first the one-person 
cells is equivalent to the process of reduction. Every player who forms a cell is 
fixed at his superior choice (if he has an inferior choice) or at his centroid strategy 
(if his pure strategies are semiduplicates). If all three players form cells for them-
selves the solution of the game is obtained immediately by such strategy fixing. 
Otherwise, the reduced game has to be analyzed further. Solutions for all decom-
posable signaling games of our class are developed in the following subsections. 
The results of the somewhat tedious case-by-case analysis are summarized in an 
overview presented in section 6 after the results of the indecomposable and irre-
ducible games have also been calculated in section 5.  
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3.1. At least the receiver forms a cell 
The situations are quite similar if only the receiver forms a cell or if the receiver 
and one type form cells or if all three players form cells. This similarity arises 
from the fact that at the latest after the elimination of the receiver’s inferior choice 
or of his semiduplicate class both types will form cells by themselves. In these 
cases, the solution of the reduced game is obtained by fixing the types at their su-
perior choices (if they have inferior choices) or at their centroids (if their pure 
strategies are semiduplicates). 
In the remaining subsections those situations are considered in which at least one 
type forms a cell but the receiver does not. 
   
3.2. Both types form cells 
In this case it is necessary to look at the ߝ-perturbed game. First, both types are 
fixed at their superior choices or at their centroid strategies. But notice that in the 
perturbed game inferior choices still occur with probability ߝ. Table 1 presents 
the conditional probabilities that the node after player 1’s “inside” choice (the left 
node in player 3’s information set in figure 3) is reached, given that the receiver 
has observed an “inside” choice. 
 
Probability for player 3’s left 
node after fixing the types 
Player 2 
Inferior choice 
“inside” 
Inferior choice 
“outside” 
Semiduplicate 
Class 
Player 1 
Inferior 
choice 
“inside” 
ߙ 
ߙ
ߙߝ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻ
 
ʹߙߝ
ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ʹߝሻߙ
 
Inferior 
choice 
“outside” 
ߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ
ߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻߝ
 ߙ 
ʹߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺͳ െ ʹߝሻߙ
 
Semi-
duplicate 
class 
ߙ
ߙ ൅ ʹሺͳ െ ߙሻߝ
 
ߙ
ߙ ൅ ʹሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻ
 ߙ 
 
Table 1: Conditional probabilities that the node after player 
1’s “inside” choice is reached, given that the receiver ob-
served an “inside” choice. 
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Given these conditional probabilities, the receiver is able to compute which of his 
two responses yields a higher expected payoff. This response is his ߝ-extreme 
strategy in the perturbed game. If both responses yield the same expected payoff, 
the receiver has to choose his centroid strategy. By letting ߝ ՜ Ͳ, the limit solu-
tion of the game is obtained. 
 
3.3. Only one type forms a cell – he has the inferior 
choice “outside” 
In the remaining parts of section 3 the cell forming type is always called player 1. 
In this subsection we consider the reduced game after elimination of an inferior 
“outside” choice of player 1. However, this choice occurs with positive probability 
due to the perturbation. The two responses of the receiver are called ݎଵ and ݎଶ, 
and player 2’s “inside” choice is called ݉ଵ and his “outside” choice is called ݉ଶ. 
The payoffs are named as in figure 4. 
Since player 2 and player 3 do not initially form cells in the case considered in 
this subsection, the following conditions for the payoffs must hold: 
࢈૚ ് ૙ǡ ࢈૛ ് ૙ǡ ࢙ࢍ࢔࢈૚ ് ࢙ࢍ࢔࢈૛ (૚7) 
 
ࢉ૚ ് ࢉ૛ǡ ࢉ૜ ് ࢉ૝ǡ ࢙ࢍ࢔ሺࢉ૚ െ ࢉ૛ሻ ് ࢙ࢍ࢔ሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ (૚8) 
 
Without loss of generality we can assume that the receiver’s responses are named 
in such a way that ܿଷ െ ܿସ ൐ Ͳ holds. In the reduced perturbed game (after elimi-
nation of player 1’s inferior “outside”) player 2 does obviously not form a cell. But 
player 3 gets an inferior choice ݎଵ if the following inequality holds: 
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ ൒ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ (૚9) 
 
This inferiority results from the fact that the left node in player 3’s  information 
set is reached in the reduced game with probability ߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ, but the right node is 
reached with probability ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻ at most. If (19) holds, player 3 is fixed at 
ݎଶ and finally player 2 has to choose ݉ଵ if ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ and ݉ଶ if ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ. 
If (19) does not hold the reduced game is not further decomposable and reduci-
ble. Therefore, the equilibrium points of this game are examined. The probability 
that player 2 chooses ݉ଵ is called ݍଶ and the probability that player 3 chooses ݎଵ 
is called ݍଷ. Best reply of player 2 is ݉ଵ if either (20) or (21) holds: 
[27] 
 
ࢗ૜ ൒
െ࢈૛
࢈૚ െ ࢈૛
ؠ ࢈ࢇ࢔ࢊ࢈૚ ൐ Ͳ (20) 
  
ࢗ૜ ൑
െ࢈૛
࢈૚ െ ࢈૛
ؠ ࢈ࢇ࢔ࢊ࢈૚ ൏ Ͳ (21) 
 
Since (17) holds, we have always Ͳ ൏ ܾ ൏ ͳ.  
ݎଵ is a best reply of player 3 if: 
ࢗ૛ ൒ ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻ
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ
ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ
ؠ ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻࢉ (22)  
  
Since (18) holds and (19) does not hold in the situation considered, it follows 
that Ͳ ൏ ܿ ൏ ͳ. 
First, consider the case that ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ. The best-reply correspondences are shown in 
figures 5 and 6 for arbitrary values of ߝ, b and c. For sufficiently small values of ߝ 
we must have ߝ ൏ ܾ ൏ ͳ െ ߝ and ߝ ൏ ሺͳ െ ߝሻܿ ൏ ͳ െ ߝ. 
                           
 
 
 
Figure 5: Best-reply correspondence of player 2 in a subclass 
of subsection 3.2.  
 
                           
 
 
 
Figure 6: Best-reply correspondence of player 3 in a subclass 
of subsection 3.2.  
 
Ͳ            ߝ                              ܾ                                                                  ͳ െ ߝ        ͳ               
ࢗ૜ 
࢓૚ ࢓૛ 
Ͳ            ߝ                                  ሺͳ െ ߝሻܿ                                                 ͳ െ ߝ        ͳ               
ࢗ૛ 
࢘૛ ࢘૚ 
[28] 
 
Obviously, the (mixed) strategy combination ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺሺͳ െ ߝሻܿǡ ܾሻ is the only 
equilibrium point of the reduced game. Defining ݍଵ as player 1’s probability to 
choose ݉ଵ (his “inside” choice), the limit solution of the whole game is therefore 
ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳǡ ܿǡ ܾሻ. 
The situation is quite different for ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ. Player 3’s best-reply correspondence is 
the same as in figure 6, and player 2’s best-reply correspondence is obtained by 
interchanging ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ in figure 5. The reduced game has three strategy com-
binations ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ as equilibrium points: ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻǡ ሺߝǡ ߝሻ and ሺሺͳ െ ߝሻܿǡ ܾሻ. The 
third one is not in the first candidate set for the solution of the reduced game be-
cause it is not the solution of a primitive formation (see subsection 2.4). There-
fore, the first candidate set contains only the two ߝ-extreme equilibrium points 
ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ and ሺߝǡ ߝሻ.  We first analyze under which conditions there is a pay-
off-dominance relationship between these two equilibrium points. 
At the first equilibrium point, player 2’s (expected) payoffs are approximately 
ሺͳ െ ߙሻܾଵ for sufficiently small ߝ, hence they are strictly positive (since ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ). At 
the second equilibrium point, his expected payoffs are approximately null. Simple 
computations show that the (expected) payoffs of player 3 are at least as much at 
the first equilibrium point than at the second one, if the following inequality 
holds:  
ࢉ૜ ൒
ࢻ
૚ െ ࢻ
ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ (23) 
 
This inequality is independent of ܿସ because the knot at which player 3 receives 
this payoff is reached in both equilibrium points with the same probability (i.e. 
ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻߝ). In the case we consider,  (19) does not hold. Therefore we have: 
ࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ ൐
ࢻ
૚ െ ࢻ ή ሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ 
(24) 
 
 
Thus, (23) always holds if ܿସis nonnegative or if it is negative but its absolute 
value is small enough. Hence, the equilibrium point ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ payoff domi-
nates the equilibrium point ሺߝǡ ߝሻ for sufficiently small ߝ if: 
ࢉ૜ ൐
ࢻ
૚ െ ࢻ
ή ሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ (25) 
  
In this case, the limit solution of the game is ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳǡͳǡͳሻ. 
If (25) does not hold (this implies that ܿସ is negative and its absolute value is 
large enough) there is no payoff-dominance relationship between the two equi-
[29] 
 
librium points in the first candidate set. Therefore a risk-dominance comparison 
between the two candidates becomes necessary.  
Since the reduced game is a 2x2-game, the lemma of subsection 2.5 can be ap-
plied. It implies that the sums of the probabilities chosen in the mixed equilibri-
um point for those strategies used in the first pure equilibrium point determines 
the result of the risk-dominance comparison. In our case it follows: 
 If ܾ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߝሻܿ ൏ ͳ, the equilibrium point ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ risk-
dominates the equilibrium point ሺߝǡ ߝሻ. This condition is satisfied for each 
ߝ ൐ Ͳ if ܾ ൅ ܿ ൑ ͳ holds. Hence, in this case we obtain ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳǡͳǡͳሻ 
as the limit solution of the game, too. 
 On the other hand, if ܾ ൅ ܿ ൐ ͳ holds, the inequality ܾ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߝሻܿ ൐ ͳ is 
implied for sufficiently small ߝ. In this case the equilibrium point ሺߝǡ ߝሻ risk-
dominates the equilibrium point ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ and we obtain ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ
ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ as the limit solution of the game.  
 
3.4. Only one type forms a cell – he has the inferior 
choice “inside” 
Now we consider the reduced perturbed game after fixing player 1 at his “outside” 
choice. Clearly, (17), (18) and ܿଷ െ ܿସ ൐ Ͳ still hold.  Player 3 obtains (after the 
fixing) an inferior choice ݎଶ if the following inequality holds: 
ࢻሺࢉ૚ െ ࢉ૛ሻ ൑ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ (26) 
  
The definition of ܿ given by (22) implies that (26) is equivalent to ܿ ൑ ͳ. If (26) 
holds, player 3 is fixed at his ݎଵ choice, and, finally, player 2 must choose ݉ଵ if 
ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ or ݉ଶ if ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ.  
If (26) does not hold, we must look at the equilibrium points of the reduced per-
turbed game. The best-reply structure is still given by (20) and (21). Different to 
(22), ݎଵ is a best reply of player 3 if the following inequality holds: 
ࢗ૛ ൒ ࢿ
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ
ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ
ؠ ࢿࢉ (27) 
  
Since (26) does not hold, we have ߝ ൏ ߝܿ for each ߝ ൐ Ͳ and we have ߝܿ ൏ ͳ െ ߝ 
for sufficiently small ߝ.  For ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ the situation is illustrated in figures 7 and 8. 
 
[30] 
 
                           
 
 
 
Figure 7: Best-reply correspondence of player 2 in a subclass 
of subsection 3.3.  
 
                           
 
 
 
Figure 8: Best-reply correspondence of player 3 in a subclass 
of subsection 3.3.  
 
The mixed-strategy combination ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺߝܿǡ ܾሻ is the only equilibrium point of 
the reduced perturbed game. Hence, for ߝ ՜ Ͳ we obtain ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͲǡͲǡ ܾሻ as 
the limit solution of the whole game. 
In the case ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ the best-reply correspondence of player 2 is obtained by inter-
changing ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ in figure 7. Now the reduced game has the three equilibrium 
points ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ, ሺߝǡ ߝሻ and ሺߝܿǡ ܾሻ. The first two equilibrium points form the 
first candidate set. Like in subsection 3.3 player 2’s (expected) payoffs at the 
ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ-equilibrium point are approximately ሺͳ െ ߙሻܾଵ (hence, strictly posi-
tive) and approximately null at the ሺߝǡ ߝሻ-equilibrium point. The (expected) pay-
offs of player 3 at the first equilibrium point are not smaller than at the second 
one if the following holds: 
ࢉ૜ ൒
ࢻ
૚ െ ࢻ
ࢿሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ (28) 
  
Since ܿଶ െ ܿଵ ൐ Ͳ, inequality (28) is fulfilled for sufficiently small ߝ if ܿଷ ൐ Ͳ holds. 
In this case the ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ-equilibrium point payoff-dominates the ሺߝǡ ߝሻ-
equilibrium point. The limit solution of the game is ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ. 
Ͳ            ߝ                              ܾ                                                                  ͳ െ ߝ        ͳ               
ࢗ૜ 
࢓૚ ࢓૛ 
Ͳ            ߝ                                         ߝܿ                                                      ͳ െ ߝ        ͳ              
ࢗ૛ 
࢘૛ ࢘૚ 
[31] 
 
If ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ and ܿଷ ൑ Ͳ, a risk-dominance comparison between the two ߝ-extreme 
equilibrium points is necessary. If ߝ goes to zero, then in the mixed equilibrium 
point of the reduced game the sum of the probabilities of the pure strategies used 
in the equilibrium point ሺߝǡ ߝሻ approaches ʹ െ ܾ ൐ ͳ, whereas the sum of the 
probabilities of the pure strategies used in the equilibrium point ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ 
approaches ܾ ൏ ͳ. According to the lemma of subsection 2.5, we obtain the result 
that the ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ-equilibrium point risk-dominates the ሺߝǡ ߝሻ-equilibrium 
point. Again, the limit solution is ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ. Hence, for ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ the limit 
solution is independent of the sign of ܿଷ. 
 
3.5. Only one type forms a cell – his pure strate-
gies are semiduplicates 
In this subsection we consider the reduced game after fixing player 1 at his cen-
troid strategy (because his two pure strategies are semiduplicates). As before, 
(13), (14) and ܿଷ െ ܿସ ൐ Ͳ hold. After fixing player 1, player 3 gets an inferior 
choice ݎଵ if the following inequality holds: 
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ ൒ ૛ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ (29) 
  
This inequality is equivalent to ܿ ൒ ʹ (see the implicit definition of c given in 
(22)). If (29) holds player 3 is fixed at his choice ݎଶ. Then, player 2 must choose 
݉ଵ if ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ and ݉ଶ if ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ. 
If ܿ ൏ ʹ, player 3 has the best reply ݎଵ if we have: 
ࢗ૛ ൒
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ
૛ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ
ؠ
ࢉ
૛
 (30) 
  
The following analysis is quite similar to that of subsection 3.3, replacing ሺͳ െ ߝሻܿ 
by ܿ ʹΤ  (compare (22) and (30)). Thus, we present the results only briefly. For 
ܿ ൏ ʹ and  ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ the mixed strategy combination ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺܿ ʹΤ ǡ ܾሻ is the only 
equilibrium point of the reduced game.  Therefore, the limit solution of the game 
is ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ ʹΤ ǡ ܿ ʹΤ ǡ ܾሻ. 
For ܿ ൏ ʹ and  ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ  there are three equilibrium points ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ, ሺߝǡ ߝሻ and 
ሺܿ ʹΤ ǡ ܾሻ. The ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ-equilibrium point payoff-dominates the ሺߝǡ ߝሻ-
equilibrium point, if (compare with (23)): 
ࢉ૜ ൒
ࢻ
૛ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻ
ሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ (3૚) 
[32] 
 
  
ܿ ൏ ʹ implies: 
ࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ ൐
ࢻ
૛ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻ
ሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ (32) 
  
Thus (31) always holds if ܿସ ൐ Ͳ or it holds if ܿସ is negative but with a small abso-
lute value. In these cases, ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ ʹΤ ǡ ͳǡͳሻ is the limit solution of the game. 
If (31) does not hold, a risk-dominance comparison between the two ߝ-extreme 
equilibrium points becomes necessary. Similar to subsection 3.3 it follows: 
 If ܾ ൅ ܿ ʹΤ ൏ ͳ holds, the equilibrium point ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ ߝሻ risk-
dominates the equilibrium point ሺߝǡ ߝሻ. We obtain ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ ʹΤ ǡ ͳǡͳሻ 
as the limit solution of the game. 
 If ܾ ൅ ܿ ʹΤ ൐ ͳ holds, the risk-dominance comparison is the very opposite 
and we obtain ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ ʹΤ ǡ ͲǡͲሻ as the limit solution of the game. 
 If ܾ ൅ ܿ ʹΤ ൌ ͳ holds, the mixed equilibrium point ሺݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺܿ ʹΤ ǡ ܾሻ is ob-
tained as the solution of the reduced game. The limit solution of the whole 
game is ሺݍଵǡ ݍଶǡ ݍଷሻ ൌ ሺͳ ʹΤ ǡ ܿ ʹΤ ǡ ܾሻ. 
 
  
[33] 
 
 
4. Normalization of the Indecomposable 
and Irreducible Games 
In section 3 we characterized the conditions under which one of the types or the 
receiver form a cell and analyzed these cases. If none of the three players forms a 
cell by himself  the signaling game is indecomposable and irreducible. This situa-
tion allows the following steps of normalization: 
1. Call the “inside” choice of the two types ݉ଵ and the “outside” choice ݉ଶ. 
2. Call the receiver player 3. 
3. A type receives nothing if he is inactive. 
4. Subtract the payoff vector after a ݉ଶ-choice of each type from those three 
payoff vectors which can be reached if this type is the active one. By this 
subtraction the new payoff vectors of the normalized game are obtained. 
5. For each type compute the difference of the receiver’s payoffs achieved af-
ter his two responses, given that this type has become active and has cho-
sen ݉ଵ. Multiply these differences with the respective probability of occur-
rence of the two types. Call that type player 1 who induces the greater ab-
solute value of these “weighted differences”. If both types induce the same 
weighted difference, call by random some type player 1. Call the remaining 
type player 2. 
6. Call player 1’s probability of becoming active ߙ. 
7. Call that response of player 3 ݎଵ that yields the smaller payoff to him if play-
er 1 becomes active and chooses ݉ଵ. Call the other response ݎଶ. Indiffer-
ence is not possible because the games considered in this section are in-
decomposable. 
The extensive form of the normalized game is shown in figure 9. The following 
properties of the payoff structure result from the process of normalization de-
scribed above and from the fact that in this section only indecomposable and ir-
reducible games are considered.  
ࢇ૚ ് ૙ǡࢇ૛ ് ૙ǡ࢙ࢍ࢔ࢇ૚ ് ࢙ࢍ࢔ࢇ૛ (33) 
  
࢈૚ ് ૙ǡ࢈૛ ് ૙ǡ࢙ࢍ࢔࢈૚ ് ࢙ࢍ࢔࢈૛ (34) 
  
ࢉ૚ ൏ ࢉ૛ (35) 
  
ࢉ૜ ൐ ࢉ૝ (36) 
[34] 
 
  
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ ൒ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ (37) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The extensive form of the normalized games.  
 
In the following the probabilities that player 1 and player 2 choose ݉ଵ are called 
ݍଵ and ݍଶ, respectively. ݍଷ is the probability that player 3 chooses ݎଵ. All three 
players have just two pure strategies, hence, player i’s mixed strategy is com-
pletely described by ݍ௜ . The conditions that a player becomes indifferent between 
his two choices are calculated now. 
INDIFFERENCE POINT OF PLAYER 1. The pure strategies ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ yield the 
same (expected) payoffs for player 1 if the following holds: 
ࢗ૜ࢇ૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢗ૜ሻࢇ૛ ൌ ૙ (38) 
  
This is equivalent to: 
ࢗ૜ ൌ
െࢇ૛
ࢇ૚ െ ࢇ૛
ؠ ࢇ (39) 
  
From (33) we can see that Ͳ ൏ ܽ ൏ ͳ holds. If ܽଵ ൏ Ͳ, then ݉ଵ is a best reply of 
player 1 if ݍଷ ൑ ܽ. If ܽଵ ൐ Ͳ, then ݉ଵ is a best reply of player 1 if ݍଷ ൒ ܽ. The next 
results are obtained in a similar way. 
0 
3 
2 1 
ሺߙሻ ሺͳȄߙሻ 
ݎଵ  ݎଵ ݎଶ ݎଶ 
݉ଵ ݉ଵ ݉ଶ ݉ଶ 
ܽଶ 
Ͳ 
ܿଶ 
ܽଵ 
Ͳ 
ܿଵ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
ܾଵ 
ܿଷ 
Ͳ 
ܾଶ 
ܿସ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
Ͳ 
[35] 
 
INDIFFERENCE POINT OF PLAYER 2.  
ࢗ૜ ൌ
െ࢈૛
࢈૚ െ ࢈૛
ؠ ࢈ (40) 
  
(34) ensures Ͳ ൏ ܾ ൏ ͳ. A best reply of player 2 is ݉ଵ if ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ and ݍଷ ൑ ܾ hold 
simultaneously or if ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ and ݍଷ ൒ ܾ hold simultaneously. 
INDIFFERENCE LINE OF PLAYER 3. The pure strategies ݎଵ and ݎଶ yield the same 
(expected) payoffs for player 3 if the following holds: 
ࢻࢗ૚ࢉ૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻࢗ૛ࢉ૜ ൌ ࢻࢗ૚ࢉ૛ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻࢗ૛ࢉ૝ (41) 
  
This is equivalent to:  
ࢗ૛ ൌ
ࢻሺࢉ૛ െ ࢉ૚ሻ
ሺ૚ െ ࢻሻሺࢉ૜ െ ࢉ૝ሻ
ࢗ૚ ؠ ࢉࢗ૚ (42) 
  
Since (35), (36) and (37) hold, it follows that ͳ ൑ ܿ ൏ λ. If ݍଶ ൒ ܿݍଵǡthen ݎଵ is a 
best reply of player 3, if ݍଶ ൑ ܿݍଵǡthen ݎଶ is a best reply of player 3. 
We have to mention that the indifference points for players 1 and 2 and the indif-
ference line for player 3 given (39), (40) and (42) matter not only for the unper-
turbed game, but represent also the exact values of the perturbed game. We show 
this only for player 1. In the perturbed game his two ߝ-extreme strategies yield 
the same expected payoffs if: 
ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻሺࢗ૜ࢇ૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢗ૜ሻࢇ૛ሻ ൌ ࢿሺࢗ૜ࢇ૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢗ૜ሻࢇ૛ሻ (43) 
  
Or, equivalently: 
ሺ૚ െ ૛ࢿሻሺࢗ૜ࢇ૚ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢗ૜ሻࢇ૛ሻ ൌ ૙ (44) 
  
Since ߝ ൏ ଵ
ଶ
, equation (44)  is equivalent to ݍଷ ൌ ܽ (see (38) and (39)). 
In this work we are only concerned with the generic cases of signaling games. The 
indecomposable and irreducible games are nongeneric if ܽ ൌ ܾ and/or if ܿ ൌ ͳ. 
Their solutions have also been calculated by the author (using if necessary the 
logarithmic tracing procedure and numerical methods), but their presentation 
will go beyond the scope of this work. 
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5. Solution of the Generic Indecompos-
able and Irreducible Games 
In this section we solve the indecomposable and irreducible games with the addi-
tional properties ܽ ് ܾ and ܿ ൐ ͳ. Let ܣ௜ሺݎଵሻ for ݅ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ be player i’s best reply to 
a ݎଵ choice of player 3. We have to distinguish eight cases which are analyzed in 
the following subsections: 
Subsection 5.1.: Case ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ 
Subsection 5.2.: Case ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ 
Subsection 5.3.: Case ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ 
Subsection 5.4.: Case ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ 
Subsection 5.5.: Case ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ 
Subsection 5.6.: Case ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ 
Subsection 5.7.: Case ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ 
Subsection 5.8.: Case ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ. 
Throughout this section we always assume that in the uniformly perturbed game 
the trembling hand parameter ߝ is sufficiently small, i.e.:  
ࢿ ൏ ܕܑܖ ൬ࢇǡ ૚ െ ࢇǡ ࢈ǡ ૚ െ ࢈ǡ
૚
ࢉ ൅ ૚
൰ (45) 
  
 
5.1. Case ࢇ ൏ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ 
The best-reply correspondences of players 1 and 2 in the case considered are giv-
en in figure 10. In the following cases we omit the corresponding figures. They 
can be obtained easily by interchanging ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ  for player i if  ܣ௜ሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ 
holds instead of ܣ௜ሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ, and by interchanging the positions of the markings 
of a and b if ܽ ൐ ܾ holds instead of  ܽ ൏ ܾ. 
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Figure 10: Best-reply correspondences of players 1 and 2 in 
dependence of player 3’s strategy in case 5.1.  
 
The best-reply correspondence of player 3 is shown in figure 11. Such figures are 
presented for all eight cases considered in this section. The horizontal axis of fig-
ure 10 refers to player 1’s mixed strategy ݍଵ and the vertical axis to player 2’s 
mixed strategy ݍଶ. The inner square corresponds to the perturbed game whereas 
the outer square to the unperturbed game. The straight line ݍଶ ൌ ܿݍଵ shows the 
set of points at which player 3 is indifferent between his two choices (see (42)). 
Points above this line have the property that ݎଵ is player 3’s unique best reply. 
The same is true for ݎଶ if we consider points below the indifference line. This fol-
lows from the discussion from (42) in section 4 and is true both for the unper-
turbed and the perturbed game. 
In figure 11 and the corresponding figures of the remaining subsections we also 
mark equilibrium points or connected sets of equilibrium points by the symbol □
i
  
if we deal with the unperturbed game and by the symbol ■
i 
 if we deal with the uni-
formly ߝ-perturbed game. The exact mathematical description of an equilibrium point 
ݍ௜ or of a set of equilibrium points ܳ௜ is given in the text. ݍ௜ or ܳ௜ correspond to □i in 
the following figures. Likewise, ݍఌ௜  or ܳఌ௜  correspond to ■
i
. The index i is the number 
of different equilibrium points or sets of equilibrium points starting with ݅ ൌ ͳ in case 
5.1. It should be clear that equilibrium points in the lower left or the upper right corner 
of figures correspond to pooling equilbria because both types choose the same signal, 
whereas equilibrium points in the upper left or lower right corner are so-called sepa-
rating equilibria. 
   
 
ࢗ૜ 
Best replies of player 2:                             ࢓૛                                                             ࢓૚ 
Best replies of player 1:           ࢓૛                                                             ࢓૚ 
0                                                                            b                                          1 
a
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Figure 11: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.1.  
 
As one can easily check with the help of figures 10 and 11, in case 5.1 the unper-
turbed game has the set ܳଵ, indicated by □1 in figure 11, as equilibrium points and 
no others: 
ࡽ૚ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢗ૜ ൑ ࢇሽ (46) 
  
But each perturbed game has for sufficiently small ߝ (see condition (45)) a 
unique equilibrium point, as indicated by ■
1
 in figure 11: 
ࢗࢿ૚ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (47) 
  
Therefore, in case 5.1 the limit solution of the game is ݍଵ ൌ ሺͲǡͲǡͲሻ. Of course, 
ݍଵ א ܳଵ. 
    
0                                                 ࢗ૚                                            1 
ࢗ૛ 
1 
 
 
 
 
૚ ࢉൗ  
ࢿ 
1 
1 
ࢗ૛ ൌ ࢉࢗ૚ 
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5.2. Case ࢇ ൏ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ǡ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ 
Figure 12 illustrates the case considered in this subsection. The unperturbed 
game has a unique equilibrium point ݍଶ ൌ ሺͳ ܿΤ ǡ ͳǡ ܽሻ which is therefore the solu-
tion of the game. The unique equilibrium point of the perturbed game is: 
ࢗࢿ૛ ൌ ሺሺ૚ െ ࢿሻ ࢉΤ ǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢇሻ (48) 
  
Clearly, ఌ՜଴ ݍఌଶ ൌ ݍଶ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.2.  
 
5.3. Case ࢇ ൏ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ǡ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ 
The equilibrium points in this case are given as follows (see figure 13): 
ࢗ૜ ൌ ሺ૙ǡ ૚ǡ ૚ሻ (49) 
  
0                                                 ࢗ૚                                            1 
ࢿ 
2 
  2 
ࢗ૛ ൌ ࢉࢗ૚ 
ࢗ૛ 
1 
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ࢗࢿ૜ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿሻ (50) 
  
ࢗ૝ ൌ ሺ૚ǡ ૙ǡ ૙ሻ (51) 
  
ࢗࢿ૝ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (52) 
  
ࡽ૞ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢇ ൑ ࢗ૜ ൑ ࢈ሽ (53) 
  
ࢗࢿ૞ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ࢉࢿǡ ࢈ሻ (54) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.3.  
Since ݍఌହ is not the solution of a primitive formation, the first candidate set of the 
perturbed game consists of ݍఌଷ and ݍఌସ. There is no payoff-dominance between the-
se two equilibrium points because player 1 gets positive payoffs at ݍఌସ and zero 
payoffs at ݍఌଷ, whereas player 2 gets positive payoffs at ݍఌଷ and zero payoffs at ݍఌସ. 
The linear tracing procedure (see subsection 2.3) has to decide which equilibrium 
point risk-dominates the other one (see subsection 2.4). 
To analyze the path of the linear tracing procedure we start with the determina-
tion of the bicentric priors. In the following pure strategy symbols with an addi-
0                                                 ࢗ૚                                            1 
ࢿ 
3 
3 
ࢗ૛ ൌ ࢉࢗ૚ 
4 
4 5 
 5 
ࢗ૛ 
1 
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tional lower index “ߝ” refer to ߝ-extreme strategies of the perturbed game. The 
bicentric priors of the first two players can be calculated easily with the help of 
the appropriate modification of figure 10. We obtain: 
Bicentric prior of player 1: 
࢖૚൫࢓૚ࢿ൯ ൌ
ࢇ െ ࢿ
૚ െ ૛ࢿ
ؠ ࢇෝ (55) 
  
Bicentric prior of player 2: 
࢖૛൫࢓૚ࢿ൯ ൌ ૚ െ
࢈ െ ࢿ
૚ െ ૛ࢿ
ؠ ૚ െ ࢈෡ (56) 
  
To compute the bicentric prior of the third player figure 14 is useful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Visualization of player 3’s bicentric prior in case 
5.3.  
Since player 3 assumes that the other player choose either ݍିଷഄ
ଷ  or ݍିଷഄ
ସ , his expec-
tations are formed along the dashed line in figure 14. x is that part of the whole 
dashed line at which ݎଵ is his best reply, y is the rest. Thus his bicentric prior is 
given by: 
0                                                 ࢗ૚                                            1 
ࢿ  
ࢗ૛ 
1 
 
 
 
 
࢞ 
࢟ 
ξ૛ࢿ 
[42] 
 
࢖૜ሺ࢘૚ࢿሻ ൌ
࢞
࢞ ൅ ࢟
 (57) 
  
Simple facts of geometry yield: 
૚
ࢉ
ൌ
࢞ ൅ ξ૛ࢿ
࢟ ൅ ξ૛ࢿ
 (58) 
  
Furthermore: 
࢞ ൅ ࢟ ൌ ξ૛ሺ૚ െ ૛ࢿሻ (59) 
  
We define Ƹܿ as follows: 
ࢉො ؠ
ࢉ െ ࢿሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻ
૚ െ ࢿሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻ
 (60) 
  
(57), (58), (59) and (60) together yield the following result. 
Bicentric prior of player 3: 
࢖૜ሺ࢘૚ࢿሻ ൌ
૚ െ ࢿሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻ
૚ ൅ ࢉ െ ૛ࢿሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻ
ؠ
૚
૚ ൅ ࢉො
 (61) 
  
The “hat” variables ොܽ, ෠ܾ and Ƹܿ, defined in (55), (56) and (60) converge to a, b and 
c, respectively, if ߝ goes to zero. Therefore, ොܽ ൏ ෠ܾ and Ƹܿ ൐ ͳ hold for sufficiently 
small ߝ. Let ݌ି௜ be the i-incomplete bicentric prior resulting from (55), (56) and 
(61). We now analyze what are the players’ best replies to the bicentric priors, i.e. 
the starting point of the linear tracing procedure. Of course, the best replies of the 
first two players only depend on player 3’s bicentric prior. 
Best reply to ݌ିଵ for player 1: 
 ݉ଵഄ݂݅ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܽ 
 ݉ଶഄ݂݅ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܽ 
Best reply to ݌ିଶ for player 2: 
 ݉ଵഄ݂݅ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܾ 
 ݉ଶഄ݂݅ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܾ 
Best reply to ݌ିଷ for player 3: 
 ݎଵഄ݂݅ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൒ ොܽܿ 
[43] 
 
 ݎଶഄ݂݅ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൑ ොܽܿ 
Now we examine which combinations of best replies to the bicentric priors are 
impossible due to parameter restrictions: 
i. If ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܽ holds then ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܾ is impossible because ܽ ൏ ܾ. 
ii. If ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܽ holds then ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൒ ොܽܿ is impossible. The first inequality 
implies ͳ െ ܽ ൑ ܽ Ƹܿ, but this is a contradiction to ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൒ ොܽܿ because 
ܽ Ƹܿ ؆ ොܽܿ and ܽ ൏ ෠ܾ for sufficiently small ߝ.  
iii. By a similar argument as above we can conclude that ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܾ and 
ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൑ ොܽܿ cannot hold simultaneously. 
Next, we want to show the implications of some relations between a, b and c for 
their corresponding “hat” variables. From (60) it is clear that Ƹܿ ൐ ܿ holds for each 
ߝ. Thus we can conclude: 
૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢇ ֜ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻΤ ൏ ܽ (62) 
  
૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢈ ֜ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻΤ ൏ ܾ (63) 
  
Now assume that ͳ െ ܾ ൌ ܽܿ holds. With the help of (55) and (56) one can see 
that this equation is equivalent to the following one: 
૚ െ ࢈෡ ൌ ࢇෝࢉ ൅ ሺࢉ െ ૚ሻ
ࢿ
૚ െ ૛ࢿ
 (64) 
  
Since ܿ ൐ ͳ holds we can conclude: 
૚ െ ࢈ ൒ ࢇࢉ ֜ ૚ െ ࢈෡ ൐ ࢇෝࢉ (65) 
  
After these preparations we can analyze the best replies to the bicentric priors for 
the four possible relations among a, b and c. The vector of best replies is denoted 
by ݍ଴. We obtain: 
૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢇ ൏ ܾ ר ͳ െ ܾ ൏ ܽܿ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (66) 
  
ࢇ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢈ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൏ ܽܿ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (67) 
  
ࢇ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢈ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൒ ࢇࢉ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿሻ (68) 
  
ࢇ ൏ ܾ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൒ ࢇࢉ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿሻ (69) 
  
No problems arise in the situations given by (66) and (69) since in both cases the 
resulting ݍ଴ is one of the two ߝ-extreme equilibrium points in the first candidate 
set of the perturbed game and, therefore, no player has an incentive to deviate 
[44] 
 
from this strategy combination along the path of the linear tracing procedure. 
Thus, in the situation described in (66) the limit solution of the game is 
 ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ and in the situation described in (69) the limit solution is 
ݍଷ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ. 
The best replies to the bicentric priors in the situations described by (67) and 
(68) do not yield an equilibrium point. But in (67) the analysis is still simple: 
Player 2 and player 3 have no incentive to deviate from their initial strategies 
since they are not only best replies to the bicentric priors but also to ݍ଴. This is 
not true for player 1, in consequence he must change his strategy if t, the tracing 
parameter, becomes sufficiently large.  After he has changed his strategy from 
݉ଶഄ  to ݉ଵഄ the ߝ-extreme equilibrium point ݍఌ
ସ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ߝǡ ߝሻ is reached and no 
further change of strategies will occur along the remaining path of the tracing 
procedure. Thus, the limit solution of the game is  ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ. 
The situation described in (68) is more difficult since here two players’ (player 2 
and player 3) best replies to the bicentric priors are not best replies to ݍ଴. To ana-
lyze the path of the linear tracing procedure it must be determined who is the first 
to change his strategy. For this reason we calculate the destabilization points (see 
subsection 2.3) of players 2 and 3. We show that for sufficiently small ߝ player 2 is 
the first player to shift to his other strategy. 
Player 2’s destabilization point ݐଶ must satisfy the following equation: 
ሺ૚ െ ࢚૛ሻ
૚
૚ ൅ ࢉො
൅ ࢚૛ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻ ൌ ࢈ (70) 
  
Thus ݐଶ is given as follows: 
࢚૛ ൌ
࢈ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻ െ ૚
ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻ െ ૚
 (7૚) 
  
Since ܾ ൐ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ  holds (see (63) and (68)), the numerator is positive, and 
since ܾ ൏ ͳ െ ߝ holds, the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Therefore, 
Ͳ ൏ ݐଶ ൏ ͳ holds for sufficiently small ߝ. We obtain: 
ܔܑܕ
ࢿ՜૙
࢚૛ ൌ ࢈ െ
૚ െ ࢈
ࢉ
 (72 ) 
  
Player 2’s destabilization point ݐଷ can be computed with the help of  (42): 
ሺ૚ െ ࢚૜ሻ൫૚ െ ࢈෡൯ ൅ ࢚૜ࢿ ൌ ሾሺ૚ െ ࢚૜ሻࢇෝ ൅ ࢚૜ࢿሿࢉ (73) 
  
Simple computations yield: 
[45] 
 
࢚૜ ൌ
૚ െ ࢈෡ െ ࢇෝࢉ
૚ െ ࢈෡ െ ࢇෝࢉ ൅ ࢿሺࢉ െ ૚ሻ
 (74) 
  
(68) ensures that the numerator is positive for sufficiently small ߝ and ܿ ൐ ͳ en-
sures that the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Hence, Ͳ ൏ ݐଷ ൏ ͳ 
holds. However, 
ܔܑܕ
ࢿ՜૙
࢚૜ ൌ ૚ (75) 
  
From (72) we know that ݐଶ is positive but smaller than b for sufficiently small ߝ. 
Since ܾ ൏ ͳ we can conclude that ݐଶ ൏ ݐଷ holds for sufficiently small ߝ. This means 
that player 2 is the first player to shift his strategy. But after his shift (from ݉ଶഄ  to 
݉ଵഄ) the equilibrium point ݍఌ
ଷ is reached and for t with ݐଶ ൏ ݐ ൑ ͳ no further 
strategy changes occur. We have shown that in the situation described by (68) 
the limit solution is ݍଷ. 
Now our results for case 5.3 can be summarized. Since ݍସ is the limit solution in 
the situations described by (66) and (67), and ݍଷ is the limit solution in the situa-
tions described by (68) and (69), we can claim: ݍଷ is the limit solution if 
ͳ െ ܾ ൒ ܽܿ holds. Otherwise ݍସ is the limit solution. 
 
5.4. Case ࢇ ൏ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ 
Figure 15 indicates the equilibrium points in case 5.4. 
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Figure 15: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.4.  
 
The formal equivalents to the square symbols in figure 15 for ݍଶ, ݍఌଶ and ݍఌହ are 
still given by (47), (48) and (54), respectively. However, ܳ଺ is not identical with 
ܳହ given by (53). Instead, we have: 
ࡽ૟ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢗ૜ ൒ ࢈ሽ (76) 
  
Furthermore: 
ࢗૠ ൌ ሺ૚ǡ ૚ǡ ૙ሻ (77) 
  
ࢗࢿૠ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (78) 
  
The equilibrium points ݍఌଶ and ݍఌହ of the perturbed game are not solutions of prim-
itive formations. Consequently the first candidate set contains only ݍఌ଻. For this 
reason the limit solution of the game is ݍ଻. 
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5.5. Case ࢇ ൐ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ 
Figure 16 illustrates the case considered now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.5. 
ݍఌଵ, ݍଶ, ݍఌଶ and ݍఌହ are still given by (46), (47), (48) and (54), respectively. Fur-
thermore: 
ࡽૡ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢗ૜ ൑ ࢈ሽ (79) 
  
Each perturbed game has three equilibrium points, but only ݍఌଵ is the solution of a 
primitive formation. For this reason, the limit solution of the case 5.5 is 
ݍଵ ൌ ሺͲǡͲǡͲሻ. 
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5.6. Case ࢇ ൐ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ǡ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ 
This case is illustrated by figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.6.  
 
The set ܳଽ is given as follows: 
ࡽૢ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢈ ൑ ࢗ૜ ൑ ࢇሽ (80) 
  
However, the perturbed game has the unique equilibrium point  ݍఌହ, given by 
(54). Hence, the limit solution in this case is: 
ࢗ૞ ൌ ሺ૙ǡ ૙ǡ ࢈ሻ (81) 
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5.7. Case ࢇ ൐ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ǡ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૚ 
Figure 18 indicates the equilibrium points in case 5.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.7.  
 
ݍଶ ൌ ሺͳ ܿΤ ǡ ͳǡ ܽሻ, and the other equilibrium points  ݍଶ, ݍఌଶ, ݍଷ, ݍఌଷ, ݍସ and ݍఌସ are 
given by (48) to (52). Since ݍఌଶ is not the solution of a primitive formation of the 
perturbed game, the first candidate set contains only ݍఌଷ and ݍఌସ. Obviously, there 
is payoff-dominance relationship between these two equilibrium points.  The 
risk-dominance by means of the linear tracing procedure has to resolve which of 
the equilibrium points is the solution of the game. 
Notice that case 5.7 is similar to case 5.3 except that ܽ ൐ ܾ holds instead of ܽ ൏ ܾ. 
The bicentric priors are equivalent to those given by (55), (56) and (61). Moreo-
ver, the best replies to the bicentric priors are exactly the same as in the analysis of 
case 5.3, and we omit the repetition of the formulas. However, in the case at hand 
we can exclude combinations of best replies to the bicentric priors different from 
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those in case 5.3.  The “hat” variables ොܽ, ෠ܾ and Ƹܿ are defined as in (55), (56) and 
(60). 
i. If ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܾ holds then ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܽ is impossible because ܾ ൏ ܽ. 
ii. If ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൑ ܾ holds then ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൒ ොܽܿ is impossible. The first inequality 
implies ͳ െ ܾ ൑ ܾ Ƹܿ, but this is a contradiction to ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൒ ොܽܿ because ܾ ؆ ෠ܾ 
and ොܽܿ ൐ ܾ Ƹܿ hold for sufficiently small ߝ.  
iii. By a similar argument as above we can conclude that ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ ൒ ܽ and 
ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൑ ොܽܿ cannot hold simultaneously. The first inequality implies 
ͳ െ ܽ ൒ ܽ Ƹܿ, but this is a contradiction to ͳ െ ෠ܾ ൑ ොܽܿ because ܽ Ƹܿ ؆ ොܽܿ and 
ܽ ൐ ෠ܾ hold for sufficiently small ߝ.  
Note that the implications for the “hat” variables given by (62), (63) and (65) 
still matter. Now we can list the possible relations between a, b and c and the re-
sulting vectors of best replies to the bicentric priors, still denoted by ݍ଴. 
૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢈ ൏ ܽ ר ͳ െ ܾ ൏ ܽܿ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (82) 
  
࢈ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢇ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൏ ܽܿ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ࢿሻ (83) 
  
࢈ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ൑ ࢇ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൒ ࢇࢉ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿሻ (84) 
  
࢈ ൏ ܽ ൏ ૚ ሺ૚ ൅ ࢉሻΤ ר ૚ െ ࢈ ൒ ࢇࢉ ֜ ࢗ૙ ൌ ሺࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿǡ ૚ െ ࢿሻ (85) 
  
In the situation described by (82) the best replies to the bicentric priors establish 
the equilibrium point ݍఌସ, and no player has an incentive to shift his strategy along 
the path of the tracing procedure. ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ is the limit solution of the game. 
Similarly, ݍଷ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ is the limit solution in the situation given by (85). 
In the situation described by (83) player 2 is the only player whose initial strate-
gy is not a best reply to ݍ଴. Hence, if the tracing parameter t becomes sufficiently 
large player 2 will shift to his other ߝ-extreme strategy ݉ଶഄ . Then the equilibrium 
point ݍఌସ is reached and no further strategy changes will occur in the remaining 
course of the linear tracing procedure. Therefore, the limit solution in this situa-
tion is ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ. 
The situation described by (84) is similar to that of (68). Now player 1’s and 
player 3’s best replies to the bicentric priors are not best replies to ݍ଴. We have to 
compute their destabilization points ݐଵ and ݐଷ to decide who is the first player to 
shift to his other strategy.  
The computation of player 1’s destabilization point ݐଵ is analogously to that of ݐଶ in 
(71) for the situation of (68). We obtain:  
[51] 
 
࢚૚ ൌ
ࢇሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻ െ ૚
ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻሺ૚ ൅ ࢉොሻ െ ૚
 (86) 
  
Since ܽ ൐ ͳ ሺͳ ൅ ƸܿሻΤ  (see (62) and (84)) the numerator is positive and since 
ܽ ൏ ͳ െ ߝ the numerator is smaller than the denominator. Therefore, Ͳ ൏ ݐଵ ൏ ͳ 
holds for sufficiently small ߝ. It follows: 
ܔܑܕ
ࢿ՜૙
࢚૚ ൌ ࢇ െ
૚ െ ࢇ
ࢉ
 (87 ) 
  
Player 3’s destabilization point ݐଷ can be obtained by interchanging the ߝ’s by 
ሺͳ െ ߝሻ’s in formulas (73) and (74) because now player 1 and player 2 both 
choose ݉ଵഄ in ݍ
௢ instead of ݉ଶഄ  as in the situation of (68). Simple computations 
yield: 
࢚૜ ൌ
૚ െ ࢈෡ െ ࢇෝࢉ
૚ െ ࢈෡ െ ࢇෝࢉ ൅ ሺ૚ െ ࢿሻሺࢉ െ ૚ሻ
 (88) 
  
In view of (65), (84) and ܿ ൐ ͳ it is clear that Ͳ ൏ ݐଷ ൏ ͳ holds for sufficiently 
small ߝ. However, different to (75) we obtain now: 
ܔܑܕ
ࢿ՜૙
࢚૜ ൌ
૚ െ ࢈ െ ࢇࢉ
ࢉ െ ࢈ െ ࢇࢉ
 (89) 
  
From (84) it follows that Ͳ ൑ ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൏ ͳ and that Ͳ ൑ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ ൏ ͳ holds. Un-
fortunately we cannot identify one player who is always the first to shift his strat-
egy. For example, let ܽ ൌ ǤͶǡ ܾ ൌ Ǥͳǡ ܿ ൌ ʹǤͲ (satisfying the conditions of (84)). 
We obtain ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൌ ͳ ͳͲ ൐ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ ൌ ͳ ͳͳΤΤ . Thus, for these parameter values 
player 3 is the first to shift his strategy. But for ܽ ൌ Ǥ͵Ͷǡ ܾ ൌ Ǥʹʹǡ ܿ ൌ ʹǤͲ, satisfy-
ing also the conditions of (84), we obtain ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൌ ͳ ͳͲͲ ൏ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ ൌ ͳ ͳͳΤΤ , 
and player 1 is the first to shift his strategy. Hence, we have to look closer at the 
parameters. 
The condition that  ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൌ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ yields the following relation among the 
parameters a, b and c: 
࢈ ൌ
૛ࢉ െ ࢇࢉሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૛ െ ࢇሻ
ሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૚ െ ࢇሻ
 (90) 
  
If (90) holds with “൏” instead of “=”, we obtain ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൏ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ and, there-
fore, ݐଵ ൏ ݐଷ for sufficiently small ߝ. Otherwise, if (90) holds with “൐” instead of 
“=”, we obtain ఌ՜଴ ݐଵ ൐ ఌ՜଴ ݐଷ and, therefore, ݐଵ ൐ ݐଷ for sufficiently small ߝ. 
But now consider the case that (90) holds strictly. To answer the question who is 
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the first to change his strategy we look directly at ݐଵ and ݐଷ as given by (86) and 
(88) and substitute the “hat” variables by their definitions in (55), (56) and (60). 
Some tedious definitions show that ݐଵ ൏ ݐଷ holds for sufficiently small ߝ if and on-
ly if: 
࢈ ൏
૛ࢉ െ ࢇࢉሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૛ െ ࢇሻ ൅ ࢇሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૜ࢉ െ ૛ െ ૛ࢿሺࢉ െ ૚ሻሻ
ሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૚ െ ࢇ െ ࢿሻ
 (91) 
  
Obviously, the numerator of the right-hand side of (90) is greater than that of 
(89) and the denominator of the right-hand side of (90) is smaller than that of 
(89). Because all numerators and denominators are positive for sufficiently small 
ߝ it follows that (89) implies (90). Hence, if (89) holds, player 1 is the first player 
to shift to his other ߝ-extreme strategy. 
Now we must consider the consequences of a strategy shift of player 1 or player 3 
along the path of the linear tracing procedure in the situation described by (84). 
If player 1 is the first to shift his strategy the strategy combination ሺߝǡ ͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ
ߝሻ, i.e. the equilibrium point ݍఌଷ, is reached and no further strategy changes occur 
afterwards in the remaining course of the linear tracing procedure.  
If player 3 is the first to shift his strategy the strategy combination ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ͳ െ
ߝǡ ߝሻ is reached. This is not an equilibrium point of the perturbed game, but now 
player 2 is the only player whose momentary strategy is not a best reply to the 
other players’ momentary strategies. So player 2 is the next one who changes his 
strategy. Then the strategy combination ሺͳ െ ߝǡ ߝǡ ߝሻ, i.e. the equilibrium point ݍఌସ, 
is reached und is sustained until the end of the tracing procedure. 
The analysis of the situation given by (84) can be summarized as follows. The 
equilibrium point ݍଷ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ is the limit solution of the game if the following 
holds: 
࢈ ൑
૛ࢉ െ ࢇࢉሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૛ െ ࢇሻ
ሺࢉ ൅ ૚ሻሺ૚ െ ࢇሻ
 (92) 
  
If (92) does not hold, ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ is the limit solution. 
Connecting this result for (84) with those obtained for (82), (83) and (85) we 
can claim: 
 If either ͳ െ ܾ ൑ ܽܿ holds or if (84) holds but (92) does not hold, 
ݍସ ൌ ሺͳǡͲǡͲሻ is the limit solution in case 5.7. 
 Otherwise, ݍଷ ൌ ሺͲǡͳǡͳሻ is the limit solution of the game in case 5.7. 
[53] 
 
 
5.8. Case ࢇ ൐ ࢈ǡ ࡭૚ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࡭૛ሺ࢘૚ሻ ൌ ࢓૛ 
The final generic case is illustrated by figure 19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Best-reply correspondences of player 3 in de-
pendence of players’ 1 and 2 strategies and equilibrium 
points in case 5.8.  
 
The equilibrium points ݍ଻ and ݍఌ଻ are explained by (77) and (78). ܳଵ଴ is given as 
follows: 
ࡽ૚૙ ൌ ሼሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻȁࢗ૚ ൌ ࢗ૛ ൌ ૙ǡ ࢗ૜ ൒ ࢇሽ (93) 
  
However ܳଵ଴ has no corresponding equilibrium points in the perturbed game. 
Hence, ݍఌ଻ is the unique equilibrium point of the perturbed game and ݍ଻ ൌ ሺͳǡͳǡͲሻ 
is the limit solution of the game. 
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6. Overview of the Results 
In this section we present an overview of the limit solutions for all generic games 
of the class of signaling games investigated. The solutions were derived in sec-
tions 3 and 5. If someone is interested in a special game this overview can be used 
to pick up quickly its solution. 
The first step to find the solution for a particular game is to check whether some 
strategy sets are semiduplicate classes or whether inferior choices exist. If this is 
the case the particular player forms an elementary cell and the game is decom-
posable and reducible (part A of this overview reports the results of section 3). 
Part B presents the results of the indecomposable and irreducible games calcu-
lated in section 5. 
 
Part A: Solutions of Decomposable and Reducible 
Games 
 
A1: At least the receiver forms an elementary cell.  
After fixing the receiver, both types eventually form cells. When they are fixed, 
the solution is obtained. 
The following case distinctions of part A are concerned with situations where the 
receiver does not initially form a cell but at least one type does. 
A2: Both types form cells.  
After fixing the two types, the conditional probabilities that the decision node af-
ter player 1’s “inside” choice is reached are given in table 1. With the help of this 
table the receiver can easily compute his best reply and the solution is obtained. 
For convenience we repeat table 1 here.  
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Probability for player 3’s left 
node after fixing the types 
Player 2 
Inferior choice 
“inside” 
Inferior choice 
“outside” 
Semiduplicate 
Class 
Player 1 
Inferior 
choice 
“inside” 
ߙ 
ߙ
ߙߝ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻ
 
ʹߙߝ
ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ʹߝሻߙ
 
Inferior 
choice 
“outside” 
ߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ
ߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻߝ
 ߙ 
ʹߙሺͳ െ ߝሻ
ͳ ൅ ሺͳ െ ʹߝሻߙ
 
Semi-
duplicate 
class 
ߙ
ߙ ൅ ʹሺͳ െ ߙሻߝ
 
ߙ
ߙ ൅ ʹሺͳ െ ߙሻሺͳ െ ߝሻ
 ߙ 
 
Table 1: Conditional probabilities that the node after player 
1’s “inside” choice is reached, given that the receiver ob-
served an “inside” choice. 
The remaining case distinctions of part A are concerned with situations where 
only one type forms a cell. We call him player 1. 
A3: Player 1 has the inferior choice “outside” 
Subcases Solution ሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻ 
ܿ ൒ ͳ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (1,1,0) 
ܿ ൒ ͳ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ (1,0,0) 
ܿ ൏ ͳ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (1,c,b) 
ܿ ൏ ͳ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൒ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ (1,1,1) 
ܿ ൏ ͳ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൏ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ, b+c൑ ͳ (1,1,1) 
ܿ ൏ ͳ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൏ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ, b+c൐ ͳ (1,0,0) 
 
Table 2: Player 1 has the inferior choice “outside”. 
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A4: Player 1 has the inferior choice “inside” 
Subcases Solution ሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻ 
ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ (0,1,1) 
ܿ ൐ ͳ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (0,0,b) 
ܿ ൑ ͳ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (0,0,1) 
 
Table 3: Player 1 has the inferior choice “inside”. 
 
A5: Player 1’s choices are semiduplicates 
Subcases Solution ሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻ 
ܿ ൒ ʹ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ (1/2,1,0) 
ܿ ൒ ʹ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (1,/2,0,0) 
ܿ ൏ ʹ, ܾଵ ൏ Ͳ (1/2,c/2,b) 
ܿ ൏ ʹ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൐ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀʹሺͳ െ ߙሻ (1/2,1,1) 
ܿ ൏ ʹ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൑ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ, b+ܿ ʹΤ ൏ ͳ (1/2,1,1) 
ܿ ൏ ʹ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൑ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ, b+ܿ ʹΤ ൌ ͳ (1/2,c/2,b) 
ܿ ൏ ʹ, ܾଵ ൐ Ͳ, ܿଷ ൑ ߙሺܿଶ െ ܿଵሻȀሺͳ െ ߙሻ, b+ܿ ʹΤ ൒ ͳ (1/2,0,0) 
 
Table 4: Player 1’s choices are semiduplicates. 
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Part B: Solutions of Indecomposable and Irreducible 
Games 
 
Cases Solution ሺࢗ૚ǡ ࢗ૛ǡ ࢗ૜ሻ 
B1: ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ (0,0,0) 
B2:ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ (1/c,1,a) 
B3: :ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ  
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൏ ܽܿ (1,0,0) 
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൒ ܽܿ (0,1,1) 
B4:ܽ ൏ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ (1,1,0) 
B5:ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ (0,0,0) 
B6: :ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ (0,0,b) 
B7: :ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶǡ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଵ  
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൏ ܽܿ (1,0,0) 
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൒ ܽܿǡ ܾ ൏ ଵ
ଵା௖
൑ ܽǡ 
ܾ ൐ ሺʹܿ െ ܽܿሺܿ൅ሻሺʹ െ ܽሻȀሺܿ ൅ ͳሻሺͳ െ ܽሻ 
(1,0,0) 
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൒ ܽܿǡ ܾ ൏ ଵ
ଵା௖
൑ ܽǡ 
ܾ ൑ ሺʹܿ െ ܽܿሺܿ൅ሻሺʹ െ ܽሻȀሺܿ ൅ ͳሻሺͳ െ ܽሻ 
(0,1,1) 
     Subcase: ͳ െ ܾ ൒ ܽܿǡ ܽ ൏ ଵ
ଵା௖
 (0,1,1) 
B8:ܽ ൐ ܾǡ ܣଵሺݎଵሻ ൌ ܣଶሺݎଵሻ ൌ ݉ଶ (1,1,0) 
 
Table 5: Solutions of indecomposable and irreducible games. 
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Summary 
 
In this paper we apply the Harsanyi-Selten solution to a class of simple signal-
ing games. Somebody who is not familiar with the theory of Harsanyi and 
Selten can use this paper as an introduction and can observe different con-
cepts and procedures at work. The overview of the results allows for easy ap-
plication to economic or other models and for comparisons to the outcomes of 
alternative equilibrium selection criteria.  
  
[59] 
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